If an ethical theory is to be useful and applicable to everyday life, its foundations must be drawn from human experiences, from what a human being has actually faced and might face in the real world. If this is not done, then it is merely a philosophical construction, and will lose itself in the gigantic conceptual spaces constructed by philosophical speculation. Ethical thought experiments are therefore to be avoided at all costs, as they complicate the issues at hand and make it appear that ethical reasoning is only proper in literary or verbal channels. It may be interesting or fun to debate hypothetical ethical dilemmas, but if there is not even one historical example that illustrate these dilemmas, their value for ethics is completely vitiated.
The author of this book unfortunately makes use of several hypothetical ethical dilemmas to assist in building his case for a theory of ethics that could, following the same nomenclature in linguistics, be described as `generative'. Therefore, moral reasoning, like language, is the result of a particular ability of the human mind (brain) and as such is universal in its grammatical patterns, even though these patterns can vary over geographical location and be parametrized by different cultures. Morality is instinctual, the author argues, and it is unaffected by the dictates of both religion and governmental institutions. The moral grammar that the author discusses, and his arguments to support it, is of course very analogous to the generative grammar of Chomskian linguistics. He even gives an analogue of the famous `poverty of the stimulus' argument of Noam Chomsky, in that he asks whether the environment contains enough information to construct a moral grammar.
This hypothesis may at first sight appear radical, and in the jacket of the book and in the author's prologue it is advertised as such. But given the advances in cognitive neuroscience that have taken place in the last fifteen years, it now seems that an ethical theory based on scientific principles is within reach. The author claims that his is such a theory, and he endeavors to justify it with what is known in evolutionary psychology, cognitive neuroscience, and related areas. It is refreshing to hear that the author wants to finally divorce morality and religion, and he feels a sense of urgency in proposing a different outlook on morality. The traditional ones have caused us great trouble, he states emphatically.
In general the author presents a fair case for his conception of morality, but there are problems with his approach. The first deals with his use of thought experiments and his insistence, sometimes merely implicit, of the superiority of the moral philosophy of John Rawls. The author views Rawls as being one of the most important contributors to the problem of justice and fairness. The moral/ethical conceptions of Rawls are contrasted with those of Immanuel Kant and David Hume, with the Kantian conception being one characterized by duty, and the Humean emphasizing emotional responses. Rawls, at least the way the author understands him, asserts that moral judgments are driven by principles that are not part of conscious awareness. Even more interesting for the Rawlsian viewpoint is that the moral agent is not usually able to provide justification for a particular action or set of actions. The `operative principles' on which judgments are based do not however have to be known by the moral agent, and this agent does not usually arrive at a moral decision by conscious reasoning from specific principles. Further, moral dilemmas or conflicts are resolved by `considered judgment', which is done on very short time scales and is essentially automatic. Lastly, the author discusses the now famous Rawlsian thought experiment of `original position' which was designed (apparently) to find the unconscious principles of justice that are contained in the moral faculty of an agent. The principles of justice must however be discovered behind a `veil of ignorance' so as to eliminate the bias of social status, religious beliefs, etc.
But Rawls falters here, since the veil of ignorance is an idealistic ephemeral construct, and while being favorable to philosophers who enjoy these types of abstractions, is not a practical strategy for discovering ethical truths. Bias is absolutely necessary for the discovery of not only ethical truth but all truth, for it enables one to frame an issue clearly so that it is accessible to experiment and study. A biased hypothesis is one that is more easily refuted if it is indeed wrong. A hypothesis that is floppy or unconstrained is much more difficult to find counterexamples to, and has much less predictive power. And the veil of ignorance seems to fall into a Marxian trap here since it is implicitly assuming that one's social status or membership in a class structure determines one's reasoning patterns on a particular issue. Rawls then invites "reasonable men" to free themselves from their social status in order to think more clearly about ethical issues. What Rawls is asking may be possible but it would be inefficient. What is really needed is a group of individuals of all backgrounds suggesting ideas as quickly as possible and then finding their flaws collectively. The search tree for principles of justice can then be more efficiently pruned. The author does in a later section of the book allude to the need and inevitability of errors in forming a worldview or theory. Errors that keep repeating in a theory, the author argues, are an indication that the theory is too rigid and immune to counterexamples. This requires a break with the past and attempting a new theory that goes against expectations. A successful theory of moral intelligence, either similar to the author's or not, will require an ability of theory to confront new situations and propose alternative courses of action.
The author is aware of the problems in Rawlsian moral philosophy, and even more aware of the extreme difficulties is testing their applicability and practicality in the real world. To test Rawlsian principles and their insistence on long-term "reflective equilibrium' one needs large blocks of time and a method for monitoring whether a collection of experimental subjects indeed followed these principles in the period under question. Did these subjects actually follow the principles or did they alter them as they confronted new situations in life?
These problems with Rawlsian philosophy do not completely undermine the author's case for an intrinsic moral grammar, but his use of thought experiments does to some extent. In the chapter entitled "Grammars of Violence" for example he discusses some favorite "moral dilemmas" of philosophers such as the "trolley problem". These are used to frame ethical issues and study responses to hypothetical scenarios, such as when it is permissible to kill. However there is not one historical example of any of these scenarios on the books, and as such they have a artificial air about them. They are good for philosophical diatribe but nothing more really, and completely unnecessary for building a scientific foundation for ethics. The author seems to be aware of this to some extent, since in that same chapter he reminds the reader that scientific evidence plays no role in the musings of moral philosophers. And he asks philosophers to consider the fact that many people may arrive at different answers to ethical dilemmas then they do, and that this variation may be more than just faulty thinking on the part of these people. Science can investigate this variation more meaningfully by taking philosophical insight "to the streets." And in this same chapter the author's analysis of `macho cultures' is fascinating and definitely worthy of attention and reflection.
There are many more thought-provoking discussions in the book, which are outside the ill-defined boundaries of philosophy and touch on experimental efforts. One of these concerns the inability of three-year old children to access the knowledge and beliefs of other people. The author believes that this fact is crucial to an understanding of the origins of moral thinking, in that the child will need to be able to identify her own shortcomings, at least when judged relative to the affect they have on other people. And it is clear when reading the chapter "The Moral Organ" that the author believes that a successful theory of morals and ethics must be tied to what is known about the brain, i.e. the research and results in the field of neuroscience must be consulted at every step. It is in this chapter that skepticism regarding the moral dilemma/thought experiments discussed earlier will be somewhat alleviated, as the author discusses some neuroimaging studies that indicate a relationship between brain activation and these moral dilemmas. The author though is intellectually honest enough to state that this research does not indicate the existence of a neural system for selectively processing moral content.
Morality that is based on religion or that is rule-based is of course rejected by the author, due mostly to its impotence in resolving important moral issues. No set of canons or legal principles can cover every contingency, and the moral agent must be able to adapt to novel situations and still maintain a moral perspective. The religions of the world fail at this miserably, and therefore their role in a scientific vision of morality will be marginal or even vacuous. The author though realizes that much work remains in deriving a science of morality, and he alludes to the growing influence of science into ethical inquiry. The role of religion, philosophy and sociology in moral considerations will therefore be eclipsed by what is being done in the scientific laboratory, and maybe at the end of the twenty-first century the divorce between science and religion will be complete, with no reconciliation possible.
Download the free Kindle app and start reading Kindle books instantly on your smartphone, tablet, or computer - no Kindle device required.
Read instantly on your browser with Kindle for Web.
Using your mobile phone camera - scan the code below and download the Kindle app.
Something went wrong. Please try your request again later.
Customers who bought this item also bought
Page 1 of 1 Start overPage 1 of 1
About the author
Follow authors to get new release updates, plus improved recommendations.
Top reviews from other countries
Anne von Blomberg
Perfekt für Atheisten & Agnostiker, die Hölle für Gläubige
Reviewed in Germany on January 15, 2007
James 'error' Campbell
For it's attempt and content, this work is surprisingly shallow
Reviewed in Canada on September 5, 2014