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Plenty of Blame to go Around: Jeb Stuart's Controversial Ride to Gettysburg Kindle Edition

4.3 out of 5 stars 153 ratings

“A welcome new account of Stuart’s fateful ride during the 1863 Pennsylvania campaign . . . well researched, vividly written, and shrewdly argued.” —Mark Grimsley, author of And Keep Moving On

June 1863. The Gettysburg Campaign is in its opening hours. Harness jingles and hoofs pound as Confederate cavalryman James Ewell Brown (JEB) Stuart leads his three brigades of veteran troopers on a ride that triggers one of the Civil War’s most bitter and enduring controversies. Instead of finding glory and victory-two objectives with which he was intimately familiar, Stuart reaped stinging criticism and substantial blame for one of the Confederacy’s most stunning and unexpected battlefield defeats. In
Plenty of Blame to Go Around: Jeb Stuart’s Controversial Ride to Gettysburg, Eric J. Wittenberg and J. David Petruzzi objectively investigate the role Stuart’s horsemen played in the disastrous campaign. It is the first book ever written on this important and endlessly fascinating subject.

Did the plumed cavalier disobey General Robert E. Lee’s orders by stripping the army of its “eyes and ears?” Was Stuart to blame for the unexpected combat that broke out at Gettysburg on July 1? Authors Wittenberg and Petruzzi, widely recognized for their study and expertise of Civil War cavalry operations, have drawn upon a massive array of primary sources, many heretofore untapped, to fully explore Stuart’s ride, its consequences, and the intense debate among participants shortly after the battle, through early post-war commentators, and among modern scholars.

The result is a richly detailed study jammed with incisive tactical commentary, new perspectives on the strategic role of the Southern cavalry, and fresh insights on every horse engagement, large and small, fought during the campaign.

Editorial Reviews

Review

“..a well detailed history, that no matter what side one might view the ride, it would be a fair objective account…well-researched book on all points clearly and cleverly argued.”
Midwest Book Review

"A fast paced, well told yarn... exhaustively researched... the definitive analysis."
Civil War Times Illustrated

"Plenty of Blame to Go Around is a welcome new account of Stuart’s fateful ride during the 1863 Pennsylvania campaign. The authors have done heroic labor among the wealth of primary sources bearing on Stuart’s activities. Here, then, is Stuart’s ride as the troopers on both sides would recognize it—well researched, vividly written, and shrewdly argued. It is, in short, as good an account of the ride as we are likely to get.”
Mark Grimsley, author of The Hard Hand of War: Union Military Policy Toward Southern Civilians, 1861–1865

“…the best study of what J.E.B. Stuart did during this campaign and his reasons for doing so. Fair and balanced, it is a necessary read…”
Civil War Courier

About the Author

J. David Petruzzi is an award-winning Civil War cavalry historian. He is the author of many articles for a wide variety of publications, and has written or co-authored several books including: (with Eric Wittenberg) Plenty of Blame to Go Around: Jeb Stuart’s Controversial Ride to Gettysburg (Savas Beatie, 2006); (with Wittenberg and Michael F. Nugent) One Continuous Fight: The Retreat from Gettysburg and the Pursuit of Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia, July 4-14, 1863 (Savas Beatie, 2008); and (with Steven Stanley) The Complete Gettysburg Guide: Walking and Driving Tours of the Battlefield, Town, Cemeteries, Field Hospital Sites, and other Topics of Historical Interest (Savas Beatie, 2009), winner of the U.S. Army Historical Foundation’s 2009 Distinguished Writing Award, Reference Category. With Stanley, he also produced The Complete Gettysburg Guide: Audio Driving and Walking Tour, Volume One: The Battlefield (Savas Beatie, 2010). Steven Stanley lives in Gettysburg and is a graphic artist specializing in historical map design and battlefield photography. His maps, considered among the best in historical cartography, have been a longtime staple of the Civil War Trust and have helped raise millions of dollars for the Trust through their preservation appeals and interpretation projects. Steve’s maps have appeared in a wide variety of publications. Co-authored by J. David Petruzzi, Steve produced the maps and the complete design of The Complete Gettysburg Guide: Walking and Driving Tours of the Battlefield, Town, Cemeteries, Field Hospital Sites, and other Topics of Historical Interest (Savas Beatie, 2009), the winner of the U.S. Army Historical Foundation’s 2009 Distinguished Writing Award, Reference Category, as well as The Complete Gettysburg Guide: Audio Driving and Walking Tour, Volume One: The Battlefield (Savas Beatie, 2010).

Eric J. Wittenberg is an Ohio attorney, accomplished Civil War cavalry historian, and award-winning author. He has penned more than a dozen books, including Gettysburg’s Forgotten Cavalry Actions, which won the 1998 Bachelder-Coddington Literary Award, and The Devil’s to Pay: John Buford at Gettysburg, which won the Gettysburg Civil War Roundtable’s 2015 Book Award.

Product details

  • ASIN ‏ : ‎ B0038U3SQ2
  • Publisher ‏ : ‎ Savas Beatie (September 12, 2006)
  • Publication date ‏ : ‎ September 12, 2006
  • Language ‏ : ‎ English
  • File size ‏ : ‎ 7.9 MB
  • Text-to-Speech ‏ : ‎ Enabled
  • Screen Reader ‏ : ‎ Supported
  • Enhanced typesetting ‏ : ‎ Enabled
  • X-Ray ‏ : ‎ Not Enabled
  • Word Wise ‏ : ‎ Enabled
  • Print length ‏ : ‎ 642 pages
  • Customer Reviews:
    4.3 out of 5 stars 153 ratings

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4.3 out of 5 stars
153 global ratings

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Customers find the book meticulously researched and well-written, with one review noting it's a must-read for Civil War scholars.

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16 customers mention "Depth of information"16 positive0 negative

Customers praise the book's depth, noting its meticulous research and compelling arguments, with one customer highlighting its extensive use of original sources.

"...The authors provide excellent detail of Stuart's dramatic ride that takes him far east of the Blue Ridge, across the Potomac near Washington, his..." Read more

"...certainly is not for the casual browser, but there is plenty of original source information in here if you are interested enough to sort through it..." Read more

"Very detailed and somewhat difficult to read...." Read more

"...It is well written and thoroughly researched. I highly recommend it to anyone interested in the Civil War in general or Gettysburg in particular." Read more

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Customers find the book very well written and easy to read.

"...the authors' case as I have but they lay out all the facts that enriches the book and provides you the basis for argument...." Read more

"Truly a magnificent book by name of the author that will be a delight to the Civil War student and novice alike...." Read more

"...It is well written and thoroughly researched. I highly recommend it to anyone interested in the Civil War in general or Gettysburg in particular." Read more

"...It's not a great read and certainly is not for the casual browser, but there is plenty of original source information in here if you are interested..." Read more

LOTS of typos
2 out of 5 stars
LOTS of typos
The book gives a very good history of Stuart's ride around the Union Army at the start of the Gettysburg campaign. As a logistician, the minimal mention of how Stuart's command fought several skirmishes, major engagements, and conducted a bombardment with a minimal baggage train lessens the narrative. This author did much the same thing with his book on Buford's engagement on July 1st. My major problem with the book is the production for the Kindle, while not as bad as RADM Layton's "I Was There", the text has way too many truncated, split, or merged words that make reading difficult. Amazon, before you post a book scanned from a hard copy, please edit the text for legibility.
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Top reviews from the United States

  • Reviewed in the United States on September 29, 2006
    As the title conveys, "Plenty of Blame to Go Around", the authors thoroughly study everyone's role in Stuart's controversial ride around the northwest moving Army of the Potomac ending up at Gettysburg late on the second day of that great battle. Most are well familiar with Stuart taking his three strongest cavalry brigades north east around the Army of the Potomac disappearing from June 25th to his eventual reunion with the ANV late July 2. With references to the shock battle of Brandy Station where Stuart desperately beat back surprise Union attack, the authors virtually start with Stuart''s orders both from Lee and Longstreet that combined with Mosby's advice, start Stuart on his eastward trek that was suppose to unite timely with General Ewell in Pennsylvania. The authors provide excellent detail of Stuart's dramatic ride that takes him far east of the Blue Ridge, across the Potomac near Washington, his capture of over 125 wagons, scare of Washington and his skirmishes and battles at Westminster, MD., Hanover, PA and at Carlisle. The overall question was did Stuart disobey his orders or were his orders vague allowing wide discretion? Did he lose the sight of his duty along with burdening himself with 125 wagons? Did he mishandle his troop leaving it worn out and ineffective? Did his cavalry survive on skill and superior force or luck? All these questions are answered by the authors in due time as they present evidence much the way notable authors studied the Little Big Horn that featured one of Stuart's Gettysburg adversaries, Custer. The authors utilize diaries, letters, reports, articles, from officers and soldiers along with those of the Union adversaries such Kilpatrick (Kilcavalry). Numerous key participants roles were evaluated from Lee, Longstreet, Mosby, Charles Marshall (who claimed that Stuart should have been shot), Walter Taylor (Lee's Adjt.) Grumble Jones, Beverly Robertson, Jubal Early, Wade Hampton and more. The authors offer direct and extensive sections of their controversial statements for you to read directly. Also included are the insights of several union commanders along with detail on the heroic fights by the doomed Farnsworth, Custer and Captain Charles Corbet. Towards the end of the book, the authors quote notable historians offering their views on the controversy printing key excepts from their books starting with relatively early works to the most recent books and authors up to the date of printing. With the views of participants and the historians, the final chapter allows the authors to narrow the arena of blame piece by piece until they formulate their own conclusions on whether Stuart was to blame or not to blame and if there was someone to blame, who was most responsible? The authors answer that question while certainly identifying everyone's faults who had any and at the end they specifically point their fingers at a party or parties. Without giving the answer away, one can debate the authors' case as I have but they lay out all the facts that enriches the book and provides you the basis for argument. One thing that does come out is that Lee depended on Stuart more than most anyone knew. Besides the excellent maps, the authors include in the appendices command organizational chart, Orders of Battle (Confederate and Union) Stuart's lengthy report, a driving tour of Stuart's battle sites including a photograph of the famous ditch/hedge jump that Stuart made to escape in Hanover and detailed notes. The book also features pictures of all the major participants both Union and Confederate with min-bios in the text.
    21 people found this helpful
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  • Reviewed in the United States on December 30, 2008
    Wittenberg and Petruzzi have compiled some great stuff in "Plenty of Blame to Go Around" "Jeb Stuart's Controversial Ride to Gettysburg". It's not a great read and certainly is not for the casual browser, but there is plenty of original source information in here if you are interested enough to sort through it and develop your own opinions about the "blame" issue. They skimped on the maps so it is best read with your own modern and civil war atlas's handy. And the conclusion would benefit from some charting and summarizing of how each original source weighed in on particular details. I suggest getting a copy of Bradley Gottfried's "Maps of Gettysburg" to help keep the overall movement situation more clear in your mind.

    The authors have taken the effort to include a detailed driving tour of many places mentioned in their account. Taking some or all of this tour will really help you to place the events in perspective.

    As the book's title indicates there was plenty of blame to go around in this situation, from Lee's tendency to give his subordinates very wide discretion to Early's failure to proactively try to link up with Stuart near Hanover and York. Historically, however, it is Stuart who has been blamed and there is plenty of justification for continuing to hold him somewhat responsible. The interesting thing about this book is that it dispels many of the traditional reasons and discloses new ones in their place. Since the success or failure of Stuart's "mission" ended up being a matter of linking up with the main army just two days earlier (June 30th rather than July 2nd) than he did, even seemingly minor delays become significant in retrospect, especially ones at the start of the ride as they caused Stuart's three brigade cavalry force to miss their window of opportunity to move unopposed into Maryland and Pennsylvania.

    Lee began slowly moving his army north on June 14th when Hooker's army was gathered to the south of the Orange & Alexander Railroad. Stuart with 5 brigades of cavalry stayed behind at the passes through the Bull Run Mountains to screen the movement, and was to then move with three of these brigades into Maryland and link up with the leading corps of the southern army.

    By June 17 Hooker had shifted some of his army north of Manasses Junction but there was thought to be sufficient room between each corps for Stuart to slip between them. But to Stuart's frustration Hooker put the army in motion toward the Potomac. In these circumstances Stuart's orders appeared to call for him to move west and catch up to Lee from behind; a much longer route North although probably the best option had he started immediately. But Stuart delayed yet another day waiting for Moseby (who was already headed North after Lee) to appear, probably because Stuart had been counting on a more daring mission, and by that point his only realistic option was a more direct route to the east of Hooker's army. What was the incorrect choice on June 23th and 24th was the correct choice on June 25th and I suspect that Stuart deliberately set it up this way.

    So just going from June 25th forward Stuart made the correct decision and at the start gets very lucky with his Potomac crossing. His luck continues and the next day his men capture a large Union wagon train. But the wagons become his trophy and slow his progress just enough that some union cavalry are able to intercept him at Hanover, PA. This further delay causes him to miss Early in York and Ewell in Carlisle. He found himself in one of those "day late and dollar short" situations. And for a column whose priority should have been brushing off obstacles and getting back into the bigger tactical picture, he spent an awful lot of time shelling towns and civilians.

    Stuart's protracted absence from Lee could easily have been a disaster for the invading Army of Northern Virginia and early on was cited by almost everyone but Lee as the main reason for the defeat at Gettysburg. That it was not was due to several bits of extremely good luck for General Lee. Unfortunately the authors don't go to sufficient lengths to develop this facet of the issue. As Moseby noted in his defense of Stuart: There were no orders to make a reconnaissance on July 1st, and no necessity for making one...The success of the first day, due to the accident of Ewell's arrival on the field when he was not expected.... The timing of Ewell's arrival could not have been more opportune even if Stuart had been rested and available, and Lee had tasked him to personally coordinate the movement.

    On the other hand Lee viewed the campaign as an opportunity to defeat the Union army in detail, driving one corps back upon the other while they were still in motion. For that to have worked Lee would have needed more than just luck, he would have needed timely and accurate intelligence of the movements of the Union army. The campaign failed because Stuart was unavailable to provide this information, but that was Lee's fault for not keeping Stuart on a tighter lease and for not having a replacement available in Stuart's absence.

    Likewise Lee's planning and extreme good fortune on July 2nd produced a situation more favorable to victory than anything Lee could have devised with the assistance of a fully functional cavalry force. Unplanned movement delays allowed time for Sickles Third Corps to settle into an exposed position yet insufficient time for them to adequately prepare defensive positions. And the error did not come to Meade's attention until it was too late to order a withdrawal from that portion of the defensive line.

    Meade, with only four days of command responsibility, foolishly tried to support Sickles by the piecemeal feeding of Second and Fifth Corps units into the trap. This sacrificed another union corps worth of troops in exactly the scenario Lee had hoped to exploit when he moved north at the start of the campaign. The 2nd day's opportunity was lost not because of the lack of any intelligence Stuart could have furnished but because Hill and several of his commanders dropped the ball; and because Willard's Brigade and the 1st Minnesota went above and beyond the call of duty.

    As for those who blame Stuart for the location and premature start of the battle itself, this too is a non-issue because things initially could not have unfolded better for Lee. Lee's description of his intentions at the start of the campaign was: "I shall throw an overwhelming force on their advance, crush it, follow up the success, drive one corps back on another, and by successive repulses and surprises before they can concentrate create a panic and virtually destroy the army". The first two days at Gettysburg afforded him an excellent opportunity to do exactly that. On July 1st his army was much more concentrated than Meade's, whose army slowly assembled (corps by corps) exactly as Lee had hoped at the start of the campaign.

    Although not decisive to the battle, there was at least one important negative consequence of Stuart's actions. I think he can be held accountable for the disaster of Pickett's Charge. Had Stuart been on the scene and rested from the beginning of the battle, Lee would have known that by late on July 2nd the large VI Corps had at last arrived and that Meade had successfully concentrated his entire army behind the fishhook line on Cemetery Ridge. Most likely even Lee's overly optimistic assessment of his army's capabilities would not have been enough for him to order that pointless charge had he known to what degree the numbers were against him.

    The tendency to overestimate Confederate capabilities (the condition of men, animals, and equipment had declined from what it had been the prior summer), coupled with a failure to acknowledge the leadership and organizational improvements over the prior six months within the Union army, was the fatal flaw that both Lee and Stuart brought with them on their respective invasions.

    Then again, what do I know? I'm only a child.
    23 people found this helpful
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  • Reviewed in the United States on September 7, 2023
    Truly a magnificent book by name of the author that will be a delight to the Civil War student and novice alike. Eric J. Wittenberg and J. David Petruzzi have written book that is an excellent fast moving title that should be purchased by students and buffs.
    Enjoy. Highly recommended by this reviewer.
    One person found this helpful
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  • Reviewed in the United States on January 18, 2024
    Very detailed and somewhat difficult to read. The reading is not made any easier by the extremely poor conversion to ebook format this conversion was obviously not reviewed by anyone. The appendices were good especially Jen Stuart’s report and the guided tour of his ride. Overall what could have been a fine work was ruined by the extremely poor conversion to e format.
    One person found this helpful
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  • Reviewed in the United States on November 25, 2013
    Until I read this book I knew very little about Jeb Stuart's infamous ride 'around the Union Army' en route to Gettysburg. This book has filled a void in my historical knowledge and perhaps filled a void in the history of the battle of Gettysburg too. It is well written and thoroughly researched. I highly recommend it to anyone interested in the Civil War in general or Gettysburg in particular.
    3 people found this helpful
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Top reviews from other countries

  • Bryn y Groes
    5.0 out of 5 stars Plenty of Praise for this book.
    Reviewed in the United Kingdom on December 3, 2015
    Once again this is a triumph from Wittenberg and Petruzzi. As the American Civil War is not that well know in the UK this review of the and especially anything that is not Gettysburg related. This book explains one of the most controversial episodes ever in the Civil War. The book is clear and balanced and comes to a conclusion that surprised me.

    The book clearly demonstrates the problems of Army Commanders managing subordinates before the days of radio communications and instant contact.
  • Kath Harris
    5.0 out of 5 stars Plenty of new info
    Reviewed in the United Kingdom on November 1, 2019
    Bought for my husband, likes it a lot

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