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The Blitzkrieg Myth: How Hitler and the Allies Misread the Strategic Realities of World War II Kindle Edition
Many military tactics during World War II were based on the assumption that new technologies would lead to decisive battlefield victories, demoralization of the enemy by intensive bombing, or even a quick surrender. Political and military leaders, Allies and Axis alike, believed that “blitzkrieg” was the best way to victory. But in The Blitzkrieg Myth, John Mosier argues that this was not the case.
Mosier examines the major European campaigns, including Germany’s invasion of Poland in the fall of 1939 and the fall of France in 1940, and demonstrates that they were, in fact, not blitzkrieg victories. Mosier asserts that new technologies clashed with the realities of conventional military tactics, and battle outcomes often depended on traditional warfare, in this bold reassessment of the military history of World War II. John Mosier is the author of The Myth of the Great War. He is a professor of English at Loyola University in New Orleans. His background as a military historian dates from his role in developing an interdisciplinary curriculum for the study of the two World Wars, a program funded by the National Endowment for the Humanities. From 1989 to 1992, he edited the New Orleans Review. “Should be valued as essential reading on the great conflict.” — Washington Times- LanguageEnglish
- PublisherHarperCollins e-books
- Publication dateFebruary 1, 2011
- File size1668 KB
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About the Author
John Mosier is the author of The Myth of the Great War. He is full professor of English at Loyola University in New Orleans, where, as chair of the English Department and associate dean of the College of Arts and Sciences, he taught primarily European literature and film. His background as a military historian dates from his role in developing an interdisciplinary curriculum for the study of the two world wars, a program funded by the National Endowment for the Humanities. From 1989 to 1992 he edited the New Orleans Review. He lives in Jefferson, Louisiana.
Excerpt. © Reprinted by permission. All rights reserved.
The Blitzkrieg Myth
How Hitler and the Allies Misread the Strategic Realities of World War IIBy Mosier, JohnPerennial
ISBN: 0060009772Chapter One
War as Pseudoscience: 1920-1939
Nothing is more dangerous in war than theoreticians.- MARSHAL PÉTAIN
The Second World War was the complete opposite of the First. In the latter, Allied propagandists had been free to weave their fables, unchecked and unquestioned. The result was a highly consistent series of myths that foundered not because of any real internal inconsistencies but because they were based on a series of palpable untruths, facts about relative losses of men and territory that could ultimately be verified or proved false.
This was not possible in the Second World War, in which, from the very first, many of the claims of the combatants were subject to verification. Americans listening to William Shirer's censored broadcasts from Berlin in 1939-40 received a surprisingly coherent and in many respects truthful account of what was happening -- even under the worst censorship it far exceeded what had been available in 1914-15. Moreover there were men in Great Britain who had bitter memories of how their government had managed the truth. When, in 1940, the government attempted to lay all the blame for the collapse on the hapless Belgians, Adm. Sir Roger Keyes stood up in the House and exposed the government's efforts for what they were -- an attempt to find a scapegoat to cover up its own ineptitude. Like all slanders, bits and pieces of this one stuck, but the myth of how Belgium betrayed the Allied cause and brought it to ruin was quickly shattered.
It was precisely the lack of any central coherent myth to recast the narrative of World War II that made all the various accounts so full of internal contradictions and anomalies. It was easy to see that, but the very incoherence of the narrative of the war made it difficult to piece together what had actually happened.
The explanation is that military theory between the wars was dominated by the work of airpower enthusiasts and apostles of armored warfare. In both cases and in every country, the theoreticians resorted to rewriting the history of the Great War to vindicate their theories about how wars should be fought. When the Second World War actually broke out on September 1, 1939, both the military theorists and the propagandists of the combatants produced converging explanations of what had happened.
The invasion of Poland provides a perfect example. Hider's propagandists were eager to portray the Polish offensive as a terrifying German military triumph that glorified not only the achievements of the Luftwaffe, which from the first had been regarded as the most National Socialist of the services, but would glorify those achievements in such a way as to cower everyone else into submission.
The airpower enthusiasts and armored apostles were only too delighted to shape the Polish campaign so that it justified their emphasis on armor and airplanes. To the followers of Giulio Douhet (and to the airmen in the United States and Great Britain who hit on these same ideas independently) the Polish campaign was proof positive that the side that lost command of the air would be quickly destroyed -- from the air. The misleading and simplistic belief that Warsaw was destroyed by the Luftwaffe was thus turned into a great symbol with all sorts of layers: on one level it represented the barbarism of Hitler's ideas, on another it served as a sort of dissuasive bogeyman for timid Frenchmen and Englishmen. And on still another level it supported the arguments that more money needed to be spent on airplanes instead of other areas of national defense.
Since Poland had even fewer tanks than it had planes, much the same process occurred. The German successes, insofar as they were not exclusively caused by airplanes, were attributed to the fact (in reality not particularly true) that they deployed tanks en masse, organized as armored divisions. An army with no armored divisions was helpless in the face of this onslaught.
However, the primary reasons for Poland's defeat were strategic, not tactical. When Erich von Manstein dissected the causes of Poland's defeat, his concluding sentence was that "Poland's defeat was the inevitable outcome of the Warsaw government's illusions about the actions its allies would take, as well as of its over-estimation of the Polish Army's ability to offer lengthy resistance." As we shall see, even this oversimplifies the situation considerably, but then Manstein, a keen supporter of Hitler, forbore to do more than briefly mention Poland's other strategic difficulties.
The point is not to deny the importance either of technology or tactics on the battlefield, but simply to say that the fundamental error lies in elevating those two components above all other concerns. The Polish government believed, with justification, that it had a guarantee from both France and England to begin offensive operations against Germany if that country attacked Poland. If Poland's army could hold out for two weeks, the Allied attack would force Germany to reallocate its army and air force to the defense of its own territory. That these agreements were actually made, and were not simply some illusion on the part of the Polish government, is incontrovertible. So is the fact that on September 14, 1939, Poland still had substantial armies in the field and was in control of a surprisingly large amount of its national territory. So although tactics and technology played an important part in the defeat, they were by no means the primary causes. In a war that pitched its army against Germany's and the Soviet Union's, Poland would have lost, whether the Germans deployed tanks and airplanes or not.
The Blitzkrieg as an Idea Both True and False
As the Germans occupied northern France and what we now call Benelux, demolished Yugoslavia and then Greece, and routed the Soviet armies in the summer of 1941, Allied analysts insisted that the cause was simple ...
Continues...Excerpted from The Blitzkrieg Mythby Mosier, John Excerpted by permission.
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Product details
- ASIN : B004G8P6Y2
- Publisher : HarperCollins e-books; Reprint edition (February 1, 2011)
- Publication date : February 1, 2011
- Language : English
- File size : 1668 KB
- Text-to-Speech : Enabled
- Screen Reader : Supported
- Enhanced typesetting : Enabled
- X-Ray : Not Enabled
- Word Wise : Enabled
- Sticky notes : On Kindle Scribe
- Print length : 727 pages
- Best Sellers Rank: #708,371 in Kindle Store (See Top 100 in Kindle Store)
- #452 in World War I History (Kindle Store)
- #482 in Military Strategy History (Kindle Store)
- #690 in History of Germany
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The author treats the topic of air war and tank war separately, but he spends most of the time talking about land warfare. He did convince me about the air war, but not so much about tank warfare. I will get to that in a moment, but first about the air war.
When the war started, Germans began with massive air attacks on civilian targets. Soon the Allies started copying them and they too resorted to bombing civilian targets. This was caused in part by technological limitations. This was long before laser-guided bombs or missiles directed by GPS. The bombers of that time era were horribly inaccurate. Only dive bombers could hit a small target with any measure of reliability, but they had short operational range and they were very vulnerable.
But the policy of indiscriminate civilian bombing was also dictated by theories developed in post WW I era. The author quotes here an Italian aviator named Douhet who wrote about massive fleets of bombers reducing cities to ruble in hours, or days at most, and creating such panic that the enemy populations will surrender.
In practice that did not work out for two reasons. The bombers (on all sides) were suffering horrendous casualties, which limited their deployment and effectiveness. But there is no question that the bombing raids in WW II had killed hundreds of thousands of people and caused massive property damage. If you include the bombings in the Pacific and add them to those in Europe, probably more than a million people have been killed from the air.
And yet, the bombed populations did not fell into panic and hysteria. While they were of course afraid of the bombs and they cried after lost loved ones and destroyed homes, nobody thought about surrendering. If anything, the bombings only increased the hate and the determination to keep on fighting. There can be no doubt that Douhet’s theories about wars being won from the air proved to be completely wrong.
But, as I said already, most of the book is about tanks. Here the author talks about a British tank officer named Fuller who was one of the pioneers of tank use in WW I. Fuller was somewhat similar to Douhet in that he believed that wars can be entirely won by a single weapon. Unlike Douhet, he thought that this weapon was not the airplane but the tank. He advocated assembling a huge force of tanks, at least few hundred, concentrating them on a very narrow front and sending them to attack. The tank then, in Fuller’s theory, were going to quickly destroy all opposition in front of them and keep advancing into enemy territory, spreading and destroying tens, even hundreds, of miles behind enemy lines.
Well, if you look at the history of combat in WW II, you do not find any examples of it. Tanks were used both successfully and unsuccessfully, but even when successful, they did not penetrate far behind enemy lines. When they did penetrate the front, they usually had to stop very quickly because they risked running out of fuel or because the enemy stopped them in some way.
To author this is a proof that Fuller was wrong, but was he? There is no doubt that Douhet was wrong. The air force commanders on all sides had tried to do precisely what Douhet was advocating and it didn’t work. But when it comes to Fuller, I could not find an example of someone assembling a force of tanks and nothing but tanks (thousands of them) and unleashing them against a very narrow front. Even the Allies and the Russians, who had enough tanks to try such a thing, never attempted it. Their tanks were sometimes grouped into powerful combat groups, but never large enough to attempts a truly “Fullerian” kind of penetration.
Does it mean that had someone tried to do precisely what Fullet suggested, would that work? Probably not. The author spends a lot of time discussing how tanks were being stopped and destroyed by the new generation of anti-tank weapons. Without infantry protection, tanks were quite vulnerable. On top of that, tanks of that time era did not perform well off-road and they had huge fuel requirements. A tank offensive on a large scale would have to take place in solid, hard, open terrain and it would need excellent logistical support.
But had all these conditions been met, could it work? We will never know. No one had attempted it.
Well then, if blitzkrieg was largely a myth, then how come German armies steamrolled through all these countries? The answer is twofold. One, they didn’t actually steamroll through them. For example, in September 1939 the advance into Poland, although rapid, was not phenomenal. The Germans lost a high number of airplanes and tanks and there were no spectacular tank charges. They won because of superior strategic situation (they had Poland surrounded on three sides) and larger and better skilled military. The fact that Russia invaded Poland on September 17th also helped.
In France in 1940, generally speaking, German tanks and airplanes were worse than the Allied machines. Not only that, but the Allies had more tanks and airplanes. But due to initial reversals the French government panicked, and then in turn the British panicked and ordered the BEF to pull out of Europe, which in turn opened a huge hole in the French front which the French generals didn’t know how to plug. The French army was more than a match for the German army, but it was poorly led.
In Africa large stretches of territory were regularly lost and gained, but they were empty. There were very few rivers or cities to stop the victors, or to serve as rallying point for the defeated. When one army lost, they got on trucks and drove and drove until they found a position where they could reorganize and form a defense. The victors pursued them until they met resistance, but all armies will advance fast until they meet resistance.
In France 1944, following the D-Day, the Germans were slowing down the Allies considerably and inflicting very heavy casualties until Hitler ordered a stupid, hopeless offensive that not only failed, but it also dangerously weakened his defenses and allowed the Allies to break through. Just as in Africa, while the Germans were fleeing, the Allies advanced quickly. But the moment the Germans stopped and organized a good defense, the Allied blitzkrieg slowed to snail’s pace, even though they had overwhelming advantage in numbers and resources.
I think that this is what makes this book so interesting. The author’s discussion of realities of WW II battlefields is so fascinating not because he ponders whether Douhet and Fuller were right or wrong, but because in doing so he demolishes many established myths. I realize that his views might appear controversial, but my readings of other modern historians and soldier memoirs largely confirms what he is saying.
This is a book to read not only for those interested in WW II, but anyone who pays attention to more modern conflicts. The idea of blitzkrieg had not disappeared. For example, the Americans have not drew lessons from the their failed air war in WW II. Years later they did try to subdue North Korea and Vietnam by bombing them. They failed. Massive armored thrusts have been attempted in other conflicts by many different countries. The results were, at best, mixed. Perhaps blitzkrieg was not only a myth back then, but still is today?