Kindle Price: $2.99

Save $36.96 (93%)

Promotions apply when you purchase

These promotions will be applied to this item:

Some promotions may be combined; others are not eligible to be combined with other offers. For details, please see the Terms & Conditions associated with these promotions.

Read with our free app
You've subscribed to ! We will preorder your items within 24 hours of when they become available. When new books are released, we'll charge your default payment method for the lowest price available during the pre-order period.
Update your device or payment method, cancel individual pre-orders or your subscription at
Your Memberships & Subscriptions

Buy for others

Give as a gift or purchase for a team or group.
Learn more

Buying and sending eBooks to others

  1. Select quantity
  2. Buy and send eBooks
  3. Recipients can read on any device

These ebooks can only be redeemed by recipients in the US. Redemption links and eBooks cannot be resold.
Kindle app logo image

Download the free Kindle app and start reading Kindle books instantly on your smartphone, tablet, or computer - no Kindle device required.

Read instantly on your browser with Kindle for Web.

Using your mobile phone camera - scan the code below and download the Kindle app.

QR code to download the Kindle App

Amazon book clubs early access
Loading your book clubs
There was a problem loading your book clubs. Please try again.
Not in a club? Learn more
Amazon book clubs early access

Join or create book clubs

Choose books together

Track your books
Bring your club to Amazon Book Clubs, start a new book club and invite your friends to join, or find a club that’s right for you for free.
Explore Amazon Book Clubs

Follow the author

Geoff Hewitt
+ Follow
More books from this author
Something went wrong. Please try your request again later.

Hitler's Armada: The Royal Navy & the Defence of Great Britain April–October 1940 Kindle Edition

by Geoff Hewitt (Author) Format: Kindle Edition
4.1 4.1 out of 5 stars 55 ratings
Best Price in 30 Days
Best Price in 30 Days means that the current price is lower than, or equal to, the lowest price this item sold for on Amazon.com in the past 30 days.
See all formats and editions
“Any historian or general lover of history in Hitler, or the importance of the Germany Navy in WWII, will find this book immensely informative.” —Nautical Research Journal
 
Hitler's Armada examines the aborted German invasion of 1940 in a fresh and original manner by looking past the myths and legends which have subsequently surrounded it, in order to arrive at significant new conclusions. Presenting fascinating detail of Hitler's Operation SEALION, author and historian Geoff Hewitt analyzes the German campaign’s weaknesses, demonstrating that control of the sea, not the air, was the critical factor in the operation’s failure. Hewitt questions the traditional British view that the Battle of Britain was the key factor in the prevention of Nazi invasion. Presenting the often overlooked importance of the Royal Navy during this period, Hewitt brings into sharp focus, possibly for the first time, the strategic dispositions of the Royal Navy anti-invasion forces. By focusing on the conflict between air and sea power in the months leading up to the summer of 1940, Hewitt challenges the supremacy of air power during this stage of the war. Thought-provoking and controversial, Hitler’s Armada presents a compelling investigation of this historic turning point in the Second World War.
Read more Read less
Previous page
  1. Print length
    246 pages
  2. Language
    English
  3. Sticky notes
    On Kindle Scribe
  4. Publisher
    Pen & Sword Maritime
  5. Publication date
    September 22, 2008
  6. File size
    20224 KB
  7. Page Flip
    Enabled
  8. Word Wise
    Enabled
  9. Enhanced typesetting
    Enabled
  10. See all details
Next page
Due to its large file size, this book may take longer to download
Add a debit or credit card to save time when you check out
Convenient and secure with 2 clicks. Add your card

Editorial Reviews

Review

“Any historian or general lover of history in Hitler, or the importance of the Germany Navy in WWII, will find this book immensely informative, yet still simple and understandable.”
Nautical Research Journal

About the Author

Geoff Hewitt is an author and historian.

Product details

  • ASIN ‏ : ‎ B009EE2E7U
  • Publisher ‏ : ‎ Pen & Sword Maritime (September 22, 2008)
  • Publication date ‏ : ‎ September 22, 2008
  • Language ‏ : ‎ English
  • File size ‏ : ‎ 20224 KB
  • Text-to-Speech ‏ : ‎ Enabled
  • Screen Reader ‏ : ‎ Supported
  • Enhanced typesetting ‏ : ‎ Enabled
  • X-Ray ‏ : ‎ Not Enabled
  • Word Wise ‏ : ‎ Enabled
  • Sticky notes ‏ : ‎ On Kindle Scribe
  • Print length ‏ : ‎ 246 pages
  • Customer Reviews:
    4.1 4.1 out of 5 stars 55 ratings

About the author

Follow authors to get new release updates, plus improved recommendations.
Geoff Hewitt

Geoff Hewitt

Brief content visible, double tap to read full content.
Full content visible, double tap to read brief content.

Discover more of the author’s books, see similar authors, read author blogs and more

Customer reviews

4.1 out of 5 stars
4.1 out of 5
55 global ratings

Top reviews from the United States

Don W. Alexander
5.0 out of 5 stars Useful presentation
Reviewed in the United States on February 13, 2021
Hewitt provides a convincing argument that the Royal Navy could have defeated a German amphibious invasion in 1940, regardless of the outcome of the battle between the British Fighter Command and the German Air Force. Most accounts associated with this period focus on German efforts to gain "Air Superiority" over the English Channel, with the assumption being that achieving this objective would have allowed for a successful German amphibious operation. Hewitt contends the Royal Navy could have defeated the German amphibious effort despite German air operations, and he presents a lot of data to support this thesis.
Air superiority is a term that deserves quantification associated with a specific operation. The Allies had air superiority on June 6, 1944, flying 10,585 sorties that day compared to the German's 319 sorties. At sea the Allies deployed five battleships, two monitors, twenty-three cruisers, and seventy-nine destroyers to provide both landing force protection and fire support. And this invasion fleet consisted of purpose-built landing craft and ships, not barges being towed by tugs. In 1940 the Germans could not possibly hope to achieve a level of air superiority that would offset their maritime deficiencies, In September, 1940, the month planned for the invasion, the Germans could muster only 1500 bombers and fighters to oppose 358 operational RAF front-line Spitfires and Hurricanes. Had the RAF conceded air superiority over the Channel, the 750 German bombers could hardly compensate for the complete lack of German naval combatants.
The best argument Hewitt presents to support his thesis that the Royal Navy would have defeated an attempted German amphibious operation in 1940 is his data contrasting the scores of Royal Navy Combatants earmarked to destroy the channel invasion compared to the make-up of the German maritime force of tugs towing barges across the Channel. Hewitt does acknowledge that the Germans derived considerable benefits from maintaining the optics of invasion. British destroyers held back in home waters to defeat the invasion were unavailable for convoy protection, and the Germans considerably increased their submarine successes against poorly escorted merchant shipping.
Certainly the least compelling argument Hewitt makes is the ability of a rejuvenated British ground force in September 1940 to contain and defeat a German invasion force. Numerical and materiel superiority rarely guaranteed any British success against the Germans during the first three years of the war, and the United Kingdom was fortunate that its security rested on overwhelming naval superiority, an advantage that the German air force in 1940 could not off set.
10 people found this helpful
Helpful
 Report
R. Forczyk
3.0 out of 5 stars The Royal Navy's Finest Hour
Reviewed in the United States on November 19, 2008
Verified Purchase
Amateur British historian Geoff Hewitt was concerned that traditional histories of the Battle of Britain and Operation Sealion - the German plan to invade England in 1940 - appear to give all credit for the British victory to the Royal Air Force, while ignoring the Royal Navy's role. Hewitt argues - with good justification - that whether or not the RAF could Luftwaffe in the skies over southern England was less significant to the prospects of a successful German invasion than the Royal Navy's undisputed control over the English Channel. The author develops two hypotheses: first, that the Royal Navy was the primary reason that the Germans did not invade and second, that if the Germans had been foolish enough to try, that the Royal Navy would have smashed the attempt in mid-channel. The author makes his case in three main sections, the first dealing with a discussion of German invasion capabilities, the second with the Royal Navy's capabilities and the third with the record of air-sea actions in Norway and off Dunkirk as a determinant of how Sealion might have played out. Overall, this book is fairly well argued and an interesting read, although it displays a bit too much British parochialism at times and the level of analysis presented to `prove' his hypotheses is not particularly balanced.

When it comes to the subject of Sealion, most authors decide a priori either for or against. This book is solidly in the "it could never have worked category," which is okay but not particularly imaginative. The opening short chapters cover the status of the Kriegsmarine surface fleet in the summer of 1940 (weak), followed by the evolution of the Sealion plan in July-September 1940 and the capabilities of the Germans to defend a crossing with mines, coastal batteries and U-Boats. German airborne capabilities are minimized and aerial resupply is ignored. The final chapters try to put it all together to assess Sealion's probability of success - as well as attempting to deflate the legend of the Battle of Britain - but the effort is only a partial success at best.

The author does present some very good points, that the Luftwaffe had a hard time sinking moving warships at sea, that neither mines nor coastal guns could effectively prevent the Royal Navy from operating in the English Channel and that ultimately, sea control was accomplished by naval forces, not airpower. I think the author also makes a good argument that traditional historiography of this period has tended to portray "the few" of the RAF as the sole defenders of Great Britain, while ignoring the Royal Navy. Readers will have little doubt after reading Hitler's Armada that the existence of the Royal Navy was a major reason why Sealion was cancelled.

However, the author's efforts to prove that the Luftwaffe could not have inflicted severe enough losses on the Royal Navy in the Channel to enable Sealion are undermined by the lack of real analysis or quantitative assessment. For example, he points out that although the Luftwaffe sank a significant number of Royal Navy warships off Dunkirk and Norway, that the navy still accomplished its mission and that these conditions (e.g. warships stationary in harbor vs. maneuvering at sea) were more favorable than they would have been in the Channel. However, in both these cases, weather and distance to target also negatively affected Luftwaffe performance more than they would have over the Channel in September 1940. Unfortunately, the author devotes much less space to Royal Navy operations off Crete, pointing out that the British intercepted a German convoy and succeeded in evacuating British troops, despite significant losses. In fact, the British intercept of the German convoy on 21 May 1941 was much less successful than portrayed here; only 297 German troops out of 2,300 were lost. He does not mention that British efforts to intercept a second convoy on 22 May were driven off by Luftwaffe bombers. Later, the Germans succeeded in getting both tanks and artillery to Crete. Furthermore, the Germans succeeded in sinking or damaging 26 of the 45 Royal Navy warships operating around Crete, indicating that the Luftwaffe could inflict crippling losses on the Royal Navy.

This author also fails to address the subjective factors that greatly influenced the first years of the Second World War. For example, the British made a great many avoidable mistakes in 1939-42 and the author's assumption that they would detect an invasion quickly and act accordingly are very contentious. In February 1942, the Germans sailed a major battle fleet through the English Channel for 12 hours before they were detected! In 1941-42, the British missed convoy after convoy going to North Africa, including two complete panzer divisions. Thus, the author should have addressed the possibility of the Germans achieving some kind of tactical surprise. Second, he ignores the fact that time and again, the Germans got lucky breaks - often due to risk-taking that no one anticipated - that led to success.

The final chapter deals with the author's conjecture that if the Germans had attempted Sealion, that it would have been blasted to pieces in mid-channel by the Royal Navy and even if a few troops had been landed, the British Army could have handled them. I found this scenario to be premised on the notion of a non-thinking opponent who would obligingly parade his entire invasion flotilla past British destroyers for target practice. Based upon how the Germans modified Fall Gelb and how they adapted to battlefield realities in Greece, North Africa and Russia, I doubt they would have been so dumb. The Sealion plan presented here is the one the British knew that they could defeat, but had it actually occurred - no plan survives first contact with the enemy - the Germans would have almost certainly modified it to get some force ashore and then work on a battle of attrition in the channel, which the Royal Navy could not sustain indefinitely.
30 people found this helpful
Helpful
 Report

Top reviews from other countries

A bookworm
5.0 out of 5 stars Puts the Royal Navy into focus without overstating the argument
Reviewed in the United Kingdom on April 5, 2023
Verified Purchase
This book does a superb job of highlighting the joined up nature of British defence during the Summer and Autumn of 1940. It shows that whilst the RAF defended the skies (and successfully too), the presence of the Royal Navy meant that a seaborne invasion was not likely to take place or even succeed. It doesn't seek to overemphasise the role of the Navy or present the argument as new, revolutionary or groundbreaking.

It places the Battle of Britain in its wider context of Norway and the Low Countries and uses them to demolish the myth that the Luftwaffe would have decimated the units of the Royal Navy as they attempted to interdict the invasion force. It also shows that the efforts of the Navy during the Norway campaign had a direct effect on the proposed plan for Operation Sealion and helped to further reduce any chances of success.

It's a shortish book but gets the argument across well and the accompanying photos are well chosen. Definitely a book for anyone with an interest in the events if 1940 and the importance of sea power for an island nation.
One person found this helpful
 Report
Mathieu Gaudreault
5.0 out of 5 stars why Hitler didn't do Operation Sealion
Reviewed in Canada on May 7, 2017
Verified Purchase
A good book on why Hitler didn't do Operation Sealion. The author analyse the capabilities of the two sides. The Kriegsmarine whas to weak, had only seven destroyers to cover a fleet of modified river barges against the most powerful navy! The author mentions that the Luftwaffe didn't use torpedoes till 1942 and bombs often missed moving ships. The author never diminish the role of the brave and courageous pilots of the RAF but its the navy who gave nightmare to Operation Sealion planners. A must have book for people who are interested in WW2 and specificly 1940.
One person found this helpful
 Report
P. H. Cartwright
5.0 out of 5 stars Long Overdue Review of the RN's Role in Thwarting Hitler's Invasion
Reviewed in the United Kingdom on July 19, 2010
Verified Purchase
I was recommended to this book by Stuart Ashburner in a comment on my review of James Holland's "The Battle of Britain" and an excellent recommendation it was. Briefly, I thought that Holland's book, although very good in many ways, tended to accept the generally-held view that RAF Fighter Command and the "Few" saved Britain from invasion in 1940. The role of the Royal Navy in deterring the planned German invasion was not given enough credit in my view.

Geoff Hewitt's "Hitler's Armada" details very comprehensively how Operation Sealion - the German invasion plan for England - was never more than a fantasy. There was no way in which the Germans could have overcome the resistance of the Royal Navy and, if launched, Sealion would have been a catastrophe for the Germans and its failure could well have ended the war several years early.

This is a scrupulously researched book which goes into a very high level of detail - for example giving the name and location of every RN destroyer in home waters in the summer of 1940.

I am one of those who think that the contribution of the Royal Navy to winning both World Wars has been undervalued by historians. Its vital part in stopping Hitler's invasion in 1940 is very little acknowledged. This book successfully attempts to set the record straight and succeeds brilliantly. Highly recommended.
7 people found this helpful
 Report
Stephen
5.0 out of 5 stars they shall not cross
Reviewed in the United Kingdom on January 11, 2022
Verified Purchase
proves invasion would not have been possible due to strength of Royal Navy
Report
Report an issue

Does this item contain inappropriate content?
Report
Do you believe that this item violates a copyright?
Report
Does this item contain quality or formatting issues?
Report