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How Reason Almost Lost Its Mind: The Strange Career of Cold War Rationality Reprint Edition, Kindle Edition

4.1 out of 5 stars 12 ratings

In the United States at the height of the Cold War, roughly between the end of World War II and the early 1980s, a new project of redefining rationality commanded the attention of sharp minds, powerful politicians, wealthy foundations, and top military brass. Its home was the human sciences—psychology, sociology, political science, and economics, among others—and its participants enlisted in an intellectual campaign to figure out what rationality should mean and how it could be deployed.           How Reason Almost Lost Its Mind brings to life the people—Herbert Simon, Oskar Morgenstern, Herman Kahn, Anatol Rapoport, Thomas Schelling, and many others—and places, including the RAND Corporation, the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, the Cowles Commission for Research and Economics, and the Council on Foreign Relations, that played a key role in putting forth a “Cold War rationality.” Decision makers harnessed this picture of rationality—optimizing, formal, algorithmic, and mechanical—in their quest to understand phenomena as diverse as economic transactions, biological evolution, political elections, international relations, and military strategy. The authors chronicle and illuminate what it meant to be rational in the age of nuclear brinkmanship.

Editorial Reviews

Review

“The inhuman assumptions of the postwar human sciences form the problematic for this fascinating book. If not quite a fons et origo, the Cold War arms race appears here as the uniquely disturbing frame for a wide-ranging campaign to extirpate irrationality by implementing strict rules of human reasoning.”

-- Theodore M. Porter, University of California, Los Angeles

"Through six roughly chronological chapters, the authors demonstrate that this austere, antihumanistic concept of rationality underpinned the work of a far-flung and heterogeneous group of scholars pursing a truly dizzying variety of research programs. . . .
How Reason Almost Lost Its Mind advances a provocative argument about a period of American social science that is now attracting increasing and well-justified attention. Historians of post war social science will certainly read this book with profit, as will scholars of the history of thought and, indeed, more generally of scientific practice in the United States." -- Michael Rossi, University of Chicago ― Endeavour

“This is an important book, one that should be read not just by historians of science but by anyone interested in the unique intellectual culture of Cold War America. In this context, reason was redefined, reduced, and simplified into a rule-governed thing—a seemingly universal technology for making choices in an uncertain world. This is a brilliant insight, and the authors carry its illumination into a range of fields, from game theory and operations research to studies of heuristics and biases in individuals and decision making in groups, from the lab and the ‘situation room’ to the wilds of Washington policy making.”
-- Hunter Heyck, University of Oklahoma

“Broadly revelatory. . . . The authors show how dangerous our behavioral scientists (and by implication their human and social science kin) might have been, co-opted as they were into the military and political decision-making in crisis situations just as physicists were co-opted into the construction of the bomb.” -- Mary S. Morgan, London School of Economics ―
Science

“Traversing territory from Micronesia to Berlin, from Kant to Kantorovich to Schelling, from psychology to economics,
How Reason Almost Lost Its Mind offers novel insights about a whole way of thinking. Moving beyond discipline-by-discipline studies, this all-star team of scholars sets the standard for new histories of American intellectual life and the vexed question of ‘Cold War thought.’” -- David C. Engerman, Brandeis University

“In the wake of World War II, a generation of self-proclaimed ‘action intellectuals’ fought to save the world from nuclear Armageddon. They nearly destroyed it. This extraordinary book explains how and why a generation of American social scientists reconceived human reason as algorithmic rationality—and how, when they did, they delivered us into a world that remains anything but rational. If you’ve ever wondered where Dr. Strangelove was born, you need look no further.”

-- Fred Turner, author of The Democratic Surround

"A dream team of historians of science and technology." -- Nick Cullather, Indiana University Bloomington ―
American Historical Review

"The authors of
How Reason Almost Lost Its Mind have made a particularly insightful contribution by showing how 'rationality' has a time and a place; by laying bare its historical contingency, they have taken 'rationality' off its methodological pedestal. . . . In this sense, this kind of scholarship empowers us as humans when we are confronted with the institutional authority of the social sciences." -- Jeroen van Dongen ― Metascience

"The authors do an excellent job of probing debates about the meaning, possibilities, and limits of rationality between the 1940s and the 1970s. . . . This masterly book makes a crucial contribution to understanding of Cold War thought, opens many new avenues for further research, and raises important questions about the durability of Cold War thinking in contemporary American social science." ―
Journal of American History

About the Author

Rebecca Lemov is associate professor of the history of science at Harvard University.


Thomas Sturm is a Ramón y Cajal Research Professor in the Department of Philosophy at the Autonomous University of Barcelona.


Judy L. Klein is professor of economics at Mary Baldwin College.


Michael D. Gordin is professor of the history of science at Princeton University.


Paul Erickson is assistant professor of history and science in society at Wesleyan University.

Product details

  • ASIN ‏ : ‎ B00GMEJ0L8
  • Publisher ‏ : ‎ The University of Chicago Press; Reprint edition (November 22, 2013)
  • Publication date ‏ : ‎ November 22, 2013
  • Language ‏ : ‎ English
  • File size ‏ : ‎ 9.5 MB
  • Text-to-Speech ‏ : ‎ Enabled
  • Screen Reader ‏ : ‎ Supported
  • Enhanced typesetting ‏ : ‎ Enabled
  • X-Ray ‏ : ‎ Not Enabled
  • Word Wise ‏ : ‎ Enabled
  • Print length ‏ : ‎ 270 pages
  • Customer Reviews:
    4.1 out of 5 stars 12 ratings

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Top reviews from the United States

  • Reviewed in the United States on November 22, 2015
    Excellent overview of how major foreign policy challenges were addressed by the changing and emerging decision paradigms.
    One person found this helpful
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  • Reviewed in the United States on November 14, 2013
    Disappointing - a missed opportunity to explain the impact of rational-choice theory (quantifying probabilities and utilities with absurd precision) and game theory on Cold War decision-making, especially in Vietnam. The Bundy brothers are not even mentioned; McNamara only in passing, with a retrospective comment from 1989.
    24 people found this helpful
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  • Reviewed in the United States on February 12, 2014
    The message of this book is eloquently expressed by a blurb on the back cover of the book: "In the wake of World War II, a generation of self-proclaimed 'action intellectuals' fought to save the world from nuclear Armageddon. They nearly destroyed it. This extraordinary book explains how and why a generation of American social scientists reconceived human reason as algorithmic rationality---and how, when they did, they delivered us into a world that remains anything but rational."

    In fact, and despite the almost unethically misleading title, the book does no such thing. Indeed, it could not because there is no systematic discussion of actual Cold War nuclear policy in the book, and the academics involved did not advocate disastrous policies at all. The issue of algorithmic rationality was extremely important for defense reasons, because nuclear alerts were signaled by computers with sophisticated sensors. But the rational decision theorists and game theorists did not suggest that rule-bound computers should dictate when to launch thermonuclear war.

    The book does suggest that these "action intellectuals" conceived of the Cold War as a prisoner's dilemma in which the only rational action was to defect (launch the bombs), but in fact (a) the Cold War was closer to a game of chicken than a prisoner's dilemma; (b) most of the intellectual participants recognized this fact; and (c) very few, except the extreme hard-liners, motivated not by a crazy academic theory but rather by their hatred of Communism, suggested a preemptive nuclear attack.

    It would be difficult for me to convey to you, dear reader, the vast gulf between the intellectual credentials of the authors of this book and the quality of the final product. A couple of chapters are perceptive and well written, but most are just a hodge-podge of mundane description and speculative excess. The book should not have been published, and Chicago University Press should be censured for allowing so misleading a title.
    24 people found this helpful
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