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The War in the Mediterranean Kindle Edition
For 1,000 days the Allied and Axis armies fought for the domination of the North African shores knowing that defeat would bring disastrous consequences. Much has been written about the conduct of the land battles and the commanders who faced each other yet, as the main protagonists realised at the time, success or failure rested on the effectiveness of their seaborne supply chain. Control of the Mediterranean was therefore crucial. In the final analysis it was the Allies’ ability to dominate the Mediterranean that bought them victory but there is no denying that it was a ‘damned close run thing’. In this authoritative study, Bernard Ireland brings a fresh clarity to the complexities and factors at play during this critical period.
- LanguageEnglish
- PublisherPen & Sword Military
- Publication dateJuly 22, 2003
- File size18627 KB
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Product details
- ASIN : B00KIXWLAG
- Publisher : Pen & Sword Military (July 22, 2003)
- Publication date : July 22, 2003
- Language : English
- File size : 18627 KB
- Text-to-Speech : Enabled
- Screen Reader : Supported
- Enhanced typesetting : Enabled
- X-Ray : Not Enabled
- Word Wise : Enabled
- Sticky notes : On Kindle Scribe
- Print length : 361 pages
- Best Sellers Rank: #1,198,757 in Kindle Store (See Top 100 in Kindle Store)
- #277 in History of North Africa
- #454 in North Africa History
- #498 in 20th Century History of the UK
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Chapter 3 includes a discussion of the Royal Navy FAA night attack on the Italian fleet at Taranto. Page 50 contains an erroneous statement that one sometimes encounters in books on this attack. It states "The low speed and open cockpits of the Swordfish [torpedo bombers] were a decided asset in that the aircraft could be steered around and between the [barrage] ballon cables." This is totally false. Several authors over the years have reviewed the pilots' war reports and there are no statements to support this claim. In fact, the pilots reported that they couldn't even see the cables, which should be no surprise as the attack was conducted at night. They just steered beneath the barrage balloons and hoped for the best. None of them hit a barrage ballon cable.
There is a interesting statement on page 57 that in the December 1940 attack against the Italian army by General O'Connor, he outran his supply organization. The Royal Navy "Inshore Squadron" came to his aid by carrying stores and ammunition to his troops. This is the first I have ever read of the RN supplying the Western Desert Force via coastal shipping. I would be interested in more detailed information in how this was accomplished. Landing craft such the later LCVP, LCI, LST, and LSI didn't exist at that time, so how did the Navy unload the cargo ships and get the supplies ashore? There were no ports in that part of Egypt and Libya; it must have taken real work to transport supplies from ship to shore.
Page 136 provides a brief discussion of the proposed German - Italian "Operation Herkules" to invade Malta in April - June 1942.
There are also discussions on the Italian shipping and supply efforts to North Africa. It was far more successful than most American or British texts lead one to realize. Per page 192, about 2.25 million tons of supplies and fuel were transported to the Italian and German armies in North Africa, of which 86% were delivered. The Italians lost 1.3 million GRT of shipping, representing 60% of the shipping that was available at the opening of hostilities.
Chapters 9 - 12 describe the British and then American advances across North Africa and Algeria to the ultimate victory in Tunisia in October 1942 to May of 1943. There are a great many books on this subject; I suppose it is needed in this book to complete the story. No new information or analyses are offered here.