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Godfrey Hutchinson
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Sparta: Unfit for Empire Kindle Edition

by Godfrey Hutchinson (Author) Format: Kindle Edition
4.3 4.3 out of 5 stars 14 ratings
The end of the Peloponnesian War saw Sparta emerge as the dominant power in the Greek world. Had she used this position wisely her hegemony might have been secure. As it was, she embarked on actions that her former allies, Thebes and Korinth, refused to support. The rise of Thebes as a threatening power to Sparta's control of Greece was largely the result of the brilliant exploits of Epaminondas and Pelopidas whose obvious examination of Spartan tactics allowed them to provide counters to them. While noting the political issues, Godfrey Hutchinson's focus is upon the strategic and tactical elements of warfare in a period almost wholly coinciding with the reign of the brilliant commander, Agesilaos, one of the joint kings of Sparta, who, astonishingly, campaigned successfully into his eighties.
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  1. Print length
    436 pages
  2. Language
    English
  3. Publisher
    Frontline Books
  4. Publication date
    November 17, 2014
  5. File size
    19.5 MB
  6. Page Flip
    Enabled
  7. Word Wise
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  8. Enhanced typesetting
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Editorial Reviews

Review

"Let us start with the main point – if you arE looking for a book which tells you what happened immediately after the Peloponnesian War which ended in 404 BC, this is probably the best book for the job... The overall text is rather like the Parson's egg. However, while that egg was 'good in parts', this book is excellent in parts, good in most of the rest, and pedestrian only on rare occasions. There are many books on Sparta in print – and this is definitely one of the better ones."
UNRV

Product details

  • ASIN ‏ : ‎ B00VET7AKY
  • Publisher ‏ : ‎ Frontline Books; Illustrated edition (November 17, 2014)
  • Publication date ‏ : ‎ November 17, 2014
  • Language ‏ : ‎ English
  • File size ‏ : ‎ 19.5 MB
  • Text-to-Speech ‏ : ‎ Enabled
  • Screen Reader ‏ : ‎ Supported
  • Enhanced typesetting ‏ : ‎ Enabled
  • X-Ray ‏ : ‎ Not Enabled
  • Word Wise ‏ : ‎ Enabled
  • Print length ‏ : ‎ 436 pages
  • Customer Reviews:
    4.3 4.3 out of 5 stars 14 ratings

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Godfrey Hutchinson

Godfrey Hutchinson

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4.3 out of 5 stars
14 global ratings

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Top reviews from the United States

  • Mick Maye
    5.0 out of 5 stars Sparta excellent book
    Reviewed in the United States on April 1, 2016
    Verified Purchase
    This is an excellent which follows the decline of Sparta after the Peloponnesus war. The choices that Sparta had and the steady decline of its manpower.
    2 people found this helpful
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  • JPS
    4.0 out of 5 stars Fit for general readers (and for others as well!)
    Reviewed in the United States on March 23, 2015
    This is yet another book on the Spartans, and yet another one that focuses on the short period (from 404 BC to 362 BC) when they dominated the Greek world, but it is a good one, and one which I enjoyed reading, despite a few problems.

    At the outset, I should probably state that a lot of the book’s content is unoriginal. A lot comes from previous authors, in particular Paul Cartledge’s “Agesilaos and the crisis of Sparta” and J.F. Lazenby’s “The Spartan Army”. The author mostly acknowledges these debts. He does however add some bits and pieces of his own. This is especially the case of some little known and relatively small encounters where the Spartans had a difficult time and/or were worsted prior to their defeat by the Thebans at Leuktra in 371 BC.

    Perhaps most of the value of this book lies in the fact that it is written in plain and simple English and easy to read. The so-called “general reader” is the clear target of this piece of military history. This contrasts with “Agesilaos”, which, although an invaluable piece of scholarship on this remarkable Spartan King and his city, is much more difficult to access. Also helpful is the use of a chronological narrative that covers this relatively short period. A nice set of maps, illustrations and plenty of diagrams for the main battles fully support the main text. This is further completed by multiple annexes on various aspects of the Spartan army and warfare at the time.

    There are however a few problems. One is a tendency towards repetition, with the annexes in particular repeating a lot of the core content.
    A more serious issue is that I found the author’s claim – that Sparta was “unfit for Empire” – rather unconvincing for several reasons although his narrative of the events was interesting and even at times fascinating. First, the author does not explain why Sparta would have been any less “fit” than either Athens or Thebes to exercise hegemony.

    Second, Sparta was indeed suffering from an increasing decline in the number of full Spartans. However, the case according to which this reduced the performances of the Spartan army in the field is not made. In fact, a close look at Spartan performances shows that their defeats had much more to do with rash or poor command and general ship than with any unproved decline in the quality of Spartan troops. The book also makes two other points that tend to jar with the idea of Sparta being “unfit for Empire”. One is that Sparta was somewhat “unlucky” in losing quite a few of its best commanders on campaigns (at least three). Another is that even its defeat at Leuktra was not as crushing as generally portrayed. The Spartans certainly went down fighting and many of them were in fact ready to fight again the next day, despite losing their King in battle.

    Another point made by the author is somewhat questionable. Following a specific tradition, the author portrays King Kleombrotos as somewhat incompetent and careless. While he does seem to have made mistakes, which the author carefully lists, he does not discuss at all what the Spartan battle plan may have been at Leuktra. It seems in fact that the Thebans won because they managed to hit and kill the Spartans and the Spartan Battle King before the Spartan right wing had the time to outflank them on their shield less side. While historians traditionally (and quite correctly) make much of the Theban innovations – a reinforced left wing and an advance in echelon with the right wing being refused – it seems that, it is with what we call a “targeted assassination” in modern parlance that they really broke the Spartans. Even then and as mentioned above, the surviving Spartans were ready for more the next day.

    More generally, the author’s narrative tends to show that Sparta mostly managed to hold its own against just about all comers for a rather long time and despite the use of Persian gold against her. The author does show that, at one point, Athens had to sue for peace to avoid being cut off once more from the grain coming from the Black Sea just as it had been at the end of the Great War. He also shows that if Sparta had not, at one point, allowed itself to be distracted and given a breathing space of several years for Thebes to recover, it would have also managed to starve it into submission.

    One other point made by the author - and by others before him, especially when studying Greek mercenaries - is nevertheless certainly true. After the Peloponnesian War, Greek armies became more professional and increasingly relied on mercenaries. They also became more versatile, with an expansion of the roles of both cavalry and light infantry, both of which being used together with hoplites and against other hoplites forces. However, as shown in this book and despite their reputation for conservatism, the Spartans also adapted.

    In particular, Agesilaos skilfully used cavalry, light infantry and the youngest and fleetest of his hoplites to catch and cut to pieces cavalry and light infantry that were harassing his troops on several occasions. So while other Greek armed forces certainly did become more professional, whether and the extent to which the Spartans’ margin of superiority may have declined is much more debatable that the author makes it out to be.
    Four stars for a great read, despite my quibbles…
    24 people found this helpful
    Helpful
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  • Tim N.
    1.0 out of 5 stars dry very dry
    Reviewed in the United States on September 5, 2015
    If you want to read something written like a text book, this is your book. I thought i was back in college falling asleep after reading 2 pages. Its a shame because i'm a huge fan of this period of history but don't waste your money
    2 people found this helpful
    Helpful
     Report

Top reviews from other countries

  • JPS
    4.0 out of 5 stars Fit for general readers (and for others as well!)
    Reviewed in the United Kingdom on February 9, 2015
    Verified Purchase
    This is yet another book on the Spartans, and yet another one that focuses on the short period (from 404 BC to 362 BC) when they dominated the Greek world, but it is a good one, and one which I enjoyed reading, despite a few problems.

    At the outset, I should probably state that a lot of the book’s content is unoriginal. A lot comes from previous authors, in particular Paul Cartledge’s “Agesilaos and the crisis of Sparta” and J.F. Lazenby’s “The Spartan Army”. The author mostly acknowledges these debts. He does however add some bits and pieces of his own. This is especially the case of some little known and relatively small encounters where the Spartans had a difficult time and/or were worsted prior to their defeat by the Thebans at Leuktra in 371 BC.

    Perhaps most of the value of this book lies in the fact that it is written in plain and simple English and easy to read. The so-called “general reader” is the clear target of this piece of military history. This contrasts with “Agesilaos”, which, although an invaluable piece of scholarship on this remarkable Spartan King and his city, is much more difficult to access. Also helpful is the use of a chronological narrative that covers this relatively short period. A nice set of maps, illustrations and plenty of diagrams for the main battles fully support the main text. This is further completed by multiple annexes on various aspects of the Spartan army and warfare at the time.

    There are however a few problems. One is a tendency towards repetition, with the annexes in particular repeating a lot of the core content.
    A more serious issue is that I found the author’s claim – that Sparta was “unfit for Empire” – rather unconvincing for several reasons although his narrative of the events was interesting and even at times fascinating. First, the author does not explain why Sparta would have been any less “fit” than either Athens or Thebes to exercise hegemony.

    Second, Sparta was indeed suffering from an increasing decline in the number of full Spartans. However, the case according to which this reduced the performances of the Spartan army in the field is not made. In fact, a close look at Spartan performances shows that their defeats had much more to do with rash or poor command and general ship than with any unproved decline in the quality of Spartan troops. The book also makes two other points that tend to jar with the idea of Sparta being “unfit for Empire”. One is that Sparta was somewhat “unlucky” in losing quite a few of its best commanders on campaigns (at least three). Another is that even its defeat at Leuktra was not as crushing as generally portrayed. The Spartans certainly went down fighting and many of them were in fact ready to fight again the next day, despite losing their King in battle.

    Another point made by the author is somewhat questionable. Following a specific tradition, the author portrays King Kleombrotos as somewhat incompetent and careless. While he does seem to have made mistakes, which the author carefully lists, he does not discuss at all what the Spartan battle plan may have been at Leuktra. It seems in fact that the Thebans won because they managed to hit and kill the Spartans and the Spartan Battle King before the Spartan right wing had the time to outflank them on their shield less side. While historians traditionally (and quite correctly) make much of the Theban innovations – a reinforced left wing and an advance in echelon with the right wing being refused – it seems that, it is with what we call a “targeted assassination” in modern parlance that they really broke the Spartans. Even then and as mentioned above, the surviving Spartans were ready for more the next day.

    More generally, the author’s narrative tends to show that Sparta mostly managed to hold its own against just about all comers for a rather long time and despite the use of Persian gold against her. The author does show that, at one point, Athens had to sue for peace to avoid being cut off once more from the grain coming from the Black Sea just as it had been at the end of the Great War. He also shows that if Sparta had not, at one point, allowed itself to be distracted and given a breathing space of several years for Thebes to recover, it would have also managed to starve it into submission.

    One other point made by the author - and by others before him, especially when studying Greek mercenaries - is nevertheless certainly true. After the Peloponnesian War, Greek armies became more professional and increasingly relied on mercenaries. They also became more versatile, with an expansion of the roles of both cavalry and light infantry, both of which being used together with hoplites and against other hoplites forces. However, as shown in this book and despite their reputation for conservatism, the Spartans also adapted.

    In particular, Agesilaos skilfully used cavalry, light infantry and the youngest and fleetest of his hoplites to catch and cut to pieces cavalry and light infantry that were harassing his troops on several occasions. So while other Greek armed forces certainly did become more professional, whether and the extent to which the Spartans’ margin of superiority may have declined is much more debatable that the author makes it out to be.
    Four stars for a great read, despite my quibbles…
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