A Want of Vigilance

The Bristoe Station Campaign, October 9-19, 1863

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Contents

The Campaign

OCTOBER 1863

Confederate Gen. Robert E. Lee climbed Clarks' Mountain in central Virginia and looked over the large Federal army before him. This was not the first time during the war Lee had looked out from the popular Confederate signal post, but this time was different. Five months previous, his trusted "right arm," Lt. Gen. Thomas "Stonewall" Jackson, was mortally wounded at Chancellorsville. His "war horse," Lt. Gen. James Longstreet, was now with Gen. Braxton Bragg in northern Georgia and had contributed to the Confederate victory at Chickamauga. His two present corps commanders, Lt. Gen. Richard Ewell and Lt. Gen. A. P. Hill, were proven division commanders, but had been less than ideal at the corps level.

Also, his army was different. The spring and summer campaign that had been full of so much promise had ended on the fields of Gettysburg in early July. The Army of Northern Virginia suffered heavy losses in men and especially in leaders. Times had been so tough after Gettysburg that Lee offered his resignation to Confederate President Jefferson Davis. Lee's health was also weakened (and historians now know he probably suffered a mild heart attack that summer).

With all of this on his mind, Lee looked out over the Army of the Potomac in Culpeper County, determined to find a way to retake the initiative. Lee believed victory could only be achieved if the Confederates held the initiative. Lee made his intentions known to President Davis, stating, "If General Meade does not move, I wish to attack him."

The Federal army that Lee looked over was also not the same Army of the Potomac it had been at Gettysburg. In victory, they had suffered heavily as well, and many of its recent reinforcements were new draftees and substitutes of questionable quality. Maj. General George Meade, new to command at Gettysburg, was still trying to prove himself to his direct superior, Maj. Gen. Henry Halleck, and to the Lincoln administration. After Gettysburg, Meade had frustrated his superiors with his perceived lack of aggression in pursuing the retreating Confederates.

With the Confederate victory in northern Georgia at Chickamauga, Meade was forced to send two of his corps west. On September 24, the XI and XII corps, totaling 18,00 men, were shipped away. Many of the men remaining with Meade were recent conscripts, and no one knew how they would perform. Both sides had worn-out cavalry, with broken mounts and weary riders. This cavalry would play a significant role in the upcoming campaign.

While the Union war effort was buoyed by the multiple victories in the summer of 1863, resentment of the Lincoln administration's handling of the war still simmered in the Northern electorate. The Federal draft was met with resistance all over the North, with the most famous being the New York City draft riots. On top of this, the anti-war Copperhead movement was gaining such support that the Democratic nominee for governor in Ohio, Clement Vallandigham, was campaigning in exile in Canada after being thrown out of the country for his strong anti-Lincoln views. While Vallandigham was the most prominent member of the anti-war faction running for office that fall, he was not the only one. Horatio Seymour was running for the governorship of New York on an anti-Lincoln platform as well. With anti-war sentiment consolidating in time for the fall elections, the Union war effort could still be defeated militarily if the Confederate army could convince Northern voters that the Southerners would continue to fight.

Knowing the importance of a fall campaign, Meade, ever cautious, felt pressure to move against Lee in Virginia so Lee could not reinforce Bragg's army in the west at Chattanooga. Though Lee's army was reduced by one corps, Meade still believed Lee's army numbered nearly 70,000 — he had no way to know Lee's returns on September 30 only showed 55,000 men present — while Meade's Army of the Potomac still held a numeral advantage at 76,000.

Meade's inaction in Culpeper that fall led Lee to seize the initiative and determine if he could outwit his adversary.

The strategy Lee envisioned was one not much different from a strategy the Federals would use the following summer: Lee wanted Confederate forces in the east to move in concert. Movements on the various fronts would then keep the enemy from reinforcing threatened points.

Lee sought permission from Jefferson Davis to conduct the campaign. With Longstreet and Bragg keeping the Federals busy in Tennessee, Lee wrote later that he wanted to "prevent [Meade] from detaching reinforcements to Rosecrans."

Lee also knew that Meade had lost two of his corps and so believed now was the best time to strike. He was still outnumbered, but that had never been a hindrance for the aggressive commander before.

Meeting with his commanders and staff, he began formulating his overall campaign strategy.

* * *

The army Lee sought to strike was spread out along the northern bank of the Rapidan River from Germanna Ford in the east to Rapidan Station and then along the northern bank of the Robertson River, a branch of the Rapidan. Meade's headquarters were at the Wallach house in Culpeper with signal stations at Mount Pony, Cedar Mountain, and Thorofare Mountain.

To Meade's advantage, the Federals recently broken the Confederate semaphore code and were able to read all the Confederate communications via their signal stations. With cavalry covering his flanks, Meade began using his horsemen to probe for weaknesses in the Confederate lines. Meade was still receiving pressure from Washington to attack Lee and planned to make an offensive of his own.

The Army of the Potomac consisted of five infantry corps with a very different command structure since the summer. The I Corps was commanded by Maj. Gen. John Newton, who replaced the popular John Reynolds, killed at Gettysburg. Newton was unproven at corps command. The II Corps also had a new commander, Maj. Gen. Gouverneur Warren, made famous at Gettysburg for his reconnaissance at Little Round Top. Warren replaced Maj. Gen. Winfield Hancock while Hancock recovered from a wound he suffered at Gettysburg. Warren was an able engineer, but he previously commanded only a small brigade of infantry. The III Corps, previously led by the tenacious Dan Sickles, was now led by Maj. Gen. William French. Referred to as "old blinky" because of an eye tick, French previously served as a division commander and a district commander. Major General George Sykes was one of Meade's most seasoned corps commanders that fall. Sykes, a Regular Army officer, led Meade's old V Corps since Meade's promotion to army commander. Finally, the VI Corps was led by probably the best corps commander in the Federal army, Maj. Gen. John Sedgwick, a proven fighter and proven leader. Promoted to corps command early in 1863, "Uncle John" was beloved by his men.

The Federal cavalry was under Maj. Gen. Alfred Pleasonton, whose cavalry earned new respect from their foe during the Gettysburg campaign. Broken into three divisions, Pleasonton had three experienced commanders. Brigadier General John Buford, one of the heroes of Gettysburg, led the First Division. Brigadier General David Gregg, leader of the Second Division, also handled himself and his men well at Gettysburg, fighting off Stuart's attacks on July 3. Finally, Brig. Gen. Judson Kilpatrick commanded the Third Division. Considered by many to be a reckless commander, Kilpatrick was arrogant and known for his aggressive demeanor.

From his headquarters at the Wallach house in Culpeper, Meade looked for a way to take the offensive against the entrenched Confederates on the south bank of the Rapidan.

* * *

Lee sought to replicate his flanking maneuvers of the summer of 1862, when the Confederates out-flanked Gen. John Pope's army along the Rapidan and then the Rappahannock rivers. However, Lee wanted the new movement to involve all the forces in Virginia. He would order the available Confederate forces in western Virginia under Maj. Gen. Sam Jones and in the Shenandoah Valley under Maj. Gen. John Imboden to also move northward. This, he hoped, would keep Federal forces in those regions engaged and keep them from joining Meade. Lee wrote to Jones on October 9: "I think it is very important that our troops everywhere should advance upon the enemy."

Also, this campaign would be one of maneuver, and the other forces moving through western Virginia might give the Federals the impression that Lee was heading back to the Shenandoah Valley for another possible invasion of Maryland.

As he laid out his offensive at his headquarters at the Rogers farm near Orange, Lee said he would rely heavily on Maj. Gen. J. E. B. Stuart's cavalry to screen his army's movement and to keep the Federals in place along the Rapidan. The movement would require secrecy and illusion. Stuart was perfect for this, and he sought to prepare his men for the task. Stuart would lead a division personally because one of his division commanders, Maj. Gen. Wade Hampton, was still recovering from wounds suffered at Gettysburg.

The infantry, meanwhile, would leave their camps and take concealed roads to the west. The destination was Culpeper Courthouse and the rear of the Army of the Potomac. Lee had received reports that Meade was no longer in force there on his western flank near Stonehouse Mountain and that Federals might be vulnerable to just such a flanking maneuver. If Lee could not gain Meade's rear, he would at least regain the initiative and possibly catch Meade in an error during his maneuvering as he tried to counter the Confederate move.

It was time, Lee decided, to make something happen.

At the Town of Orange

The town of Orange, strategically located in central Virginia south of the Rapidan River and astride the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, saw little fighting during the war. The town was the scene of many encampments and troop movements, though. When Lee's men arrived here in early September, their duty was to protect the railroad and the southern bank of the Rapidan River. The Army of Northern Virginia built significant earthworks guarding the various fords and approaches.

GPS: N 38.244861 W 78.109857

Clarks' Mountain, located a few miles northeast of Orange, served throughout the war as a significant observation post for the Confederates. Today, it can be easily identified by the various communication towers on its summit. Most of it is private property, though portions can be accessed by a public road to obtain the view that Lee had in 1863.

Just east of Orange was the Rogers farm, where Lee set up his headquarters before and after the Bristoe campaign. Today, a state marker along Rt. 20 east of Orange marks the nearby location, which is now on private property.

In downtown Orange, St. Thomas Episcopal Church was frequented by the officers of the Army of Northern Virginia, including Lee himself. Today, the church marks the pew where — legend has it — Lee preferred to sit. During late summer and early fall of 1863, many soldiers on both sides wrote of a religious revival sweeping the armies. The church was also used at various times as a hospital throughout the war.

South of downtown Orange along Rt. 15 is Mayhurst, today a bed and breakfast. Here is where Lt. Gen. A. P. Hill had his headquarters from the fall of 1863 through the spring of 1864.

Finally, located west of town near Montpelier — the home of James Madison and current historic house museum — is the location of Brig. Gen. Samuel McGowan's South Carolina brigade winter encampments. Here several representative winter huts are recreated to give visitors an example of the large Confederate camps that existed in Orange County during the winter of 1863. Montpelier maintains an access road to the recreated Confederate camp and the Gilmore Cabin on the right side of the highway, just past Montpelier's entrance.

[right arrow] To Stop 2

Take Rt. 20 west from Orange. You will pass by Montpelier, and you may be interested in stopping at the Civil War winter encampment exhibit on the right side of the road across from the Montpelier main entrance.

Beyond, continue on Rt. 20 and take a right onto Rt. 231 (Blue Ridge Tnpk.). Follow Rt. 231 to Rt. 29 east into Madison. Along this route you will pass the Jack's Shop battlefield; a Civil War Trails sign on the left side of the road just after the village of Rochelle marks the area. This cavalry battle was fought in September 1863.

Continue approximately eight miles past Madison to Leon (historically James City). The Virginia Civil War Trails marker and parking lot is on the right side of the highway.

GPS: N 38.437633, W 78.137937

This Month Won't Pass Away Without a Battle

OCTOBER 8–10, 1863

On October 8, Lee ordered his quartermasters and pioneers to prepare for the advance, and he evacuated most of his hospitalized men out of Orange via railroad to Gordonsville. J. E. B. Stuart with Hampton's division would lead the advance and screen the infantry. Stuart would also seek out and silence the troublesome Federal signal station atop Thorofare Mountain.

Lee's plan for the campaign was simple. He intended to get around the Federal flank or rear and fight a battle on his terms or at least force Meade north of the Rappahannock River. Much of his 1862 Second Manassas campaign strategy would be replicated: make the Federal army move northward while, in the meantime, trying to find an advantageous opportunity to attack them while in motion.

The army would march as two wings. The corps under Lt. Gen. A. P. Hill would march on a wider, more western arc while Lt. Gen. Richard Ewell's corps would take a more direct route. Both wings would march to Madison Courthouse, then on to a point west or to the rear of Culpeper and Meade's army.

Maj. General Fitz Lee's cavalry division, with an infantry brigade under the temporary command of Col. Thomas Garrett, would be left behind to fill the old Rapidan entrenchments and watch the various fords. Their role was to maintain a Confederate presence and attempt to deceive the Federals about the army's general movement west and north. They also had to make sure the Federals would not swing southward and attack the rear of the moving Confederate army.

Lee, who was suffering a bout of rheumatism, was in great pain and rode in a wagon instead of on horseback. He attached himself to Ewell's corps — the one most likely to come into contact with the Army of the Potomac.

Lee wanted there to be an element of surprise, but the newspapers in Richmond were already reporting his northward movement before it even began. The newspaper reports "are injurious to us," Lee wrote to Confederate Secretary of War James Seddon. "[W]e have difficulties enough to overcome interposed by our enemies, without having them augmented by our friends."

As Confederate signalmen sent messages back and forth to the various commanders, they were being watched by their counterparts. The Federal signal stations at Thorofare Mountain, Cedar Mountain, and Mount Pony had all been tasked with watching the Confederate movements. This allowed the Federals to be aware of the Confederate movement before it began, although Meade would be left guessing if this new movement was an offensive or a movement south.

On October 8, Confederate infantry began shifting to the various fords along the Rapidan River near Orange. Ewell's corps, positioned east of Orange near Morton and Raccoon Fords, moved west to new camps near Barnett's Ford northwest of Orange. Hill's corps moved from their camps around Orange and moved west near Cave's Ford.

The Confederate soldiers knew they were probably opening another campaign. As Stanley Russell of the 13th Virginia observed, "I do not think this month will pass away without a battle."

Morale ran high and most men were excited to be on the move again. "[W]e were in fit shape for a rift with Meade," wrote William Long, "and keen to get even with him for the attack we met at Gettysburg."

* * *

On the early morning of October 9, columns of Confederates began to cross the Rapidan. Hill's corps led the way, crossing at Cave's Ford with Ewell's men crossing at Barnett's Ford. Lee ordered his men to travel back roads to avoid detection by the Federal signal stations. The march followed "no particular road" and avoided marching over hills through dusty roads — all to provide the highest privacy possible for Lee's march.

As much as Lee tried to keep his movement secret, though, Federal pickets reported the activity. Also, with the help of well-placed spies and the cracking of the Confederate semaphore code, Meade was aware of the Confederate movement. The problem Meade was having, though, was where was Lee going? Was it a feint, or was it a retrograde movement southward?

Meade would rely on his cavalry to bring him more intelligence. He also decided to push across the Rapidan to see if that would give him a clearer picture. Meade could either identify Lee's intentions or possibly attack him while the Confederates moved toward Richmond.