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The Grand Strategy of Classical Sparta: The Persian Challenge (Yale Library of Military History) Kindle Edition
More than 2500 years ago a confederation of small Greek city-states defeated the invading armies of Persia, the most powerful empire in the world. In this meticulously researched study, historian Paul Rahe argues that Sparta was responsible for the initial establishment of the Hellenic defensive coalition and was the most essential player in its ultimate victory.
Drawing from an impressive range of ancient sources, including Herodotus and Plutarch, the author veers from the traditional Atheno-centric view of the Greco-Persian Wars to examine from a Spartan perspective the strategy that halted the Persian juggernaut. Rahe provides a fascinating, detailed picture of life in Sparta circa 480 B.C., revealing how the Spartans’ form of government and the regimen to which they subjected themselves instilled within them the pride, confidence, discipline, and discernment necessary to forge an alliance that would stand firm against a great empire, driven by religious fervor, that held sway over two-fifths of the human race.
“[Rahe] has an excellent eye for military logistics . . . crisp and persuasive.” —The Wall Street Journal
“Intensely well-researched and well-balanced.” —Steve Donoghue, The National
“Masterful.” —Joseph Bottum, Books and Culture
“A serious scholarly endeavor.” —Eric W. Robinson, American Historical Review
“This brilliant revisionist study . . . reminds us how Sparta . . . saved Western freedom from the Persian aggression—and did so because of its innate courage, political stability, and underappreciated genius.” —Victor Davis Hanson, author of The Other Greeks
“Full of keen understandings that help explain Spartan policy, diplomacy, and strategy.” —Donald Kagan, author of The Peloponnesian War
- LanguageEnglish
- PublisherYale University Press
- Publication dateNovember 24, 2015
- File size12.7 MB
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Editorial Reviews
Review
"Rahe’s book, the first in a projected trilogy charting the life of classical Sparta, is intensely well-researched and well-balanced . . . The Grand Strategy of Classical Sparta tells the old stories in a new light, from the Spartan point of view."—Steve Donoghue, The National
"Masterful."—Joseph Bottum, Books and Culture
"Rahe sets the story in a complicated geopolitical context, with a large cast of characters connected through a series of shifting alliances. But his relaxed, even jaunty style and his thorough analysis sustain the narrative and hold the reader’s attention. And his appreciation of the practicalities of ancient warfare—from the challenge of managing large numbers of horses to the difficulty of maneuvering triremes, the chief naval vessels of the era—adds credibility to his accounts of the key battles."—Lawrence D. Freedman, Foreign Affairs
"[Successfully] provide[s] a mostly narrative history (with some fine analysis) of Spartan and Persian actions up to and including the Persian Wars."—Timothy Doran, Bryn Mawr Classical Review
“A serious scholarly endeavor.”—Eric W. Robinson, American Historical Review
“Rahe powerfully illustrates. . . that this regime determined the character and limits of Sparta’s domestic and foreign policy.”—Susan D. Collins, Review of Politics
“[Rahe] has now published four volumes in his history of Sparta . . . Each book is thoroughly readable, and in many cases becomes a page-turner as the excitement of the events Rahe relates is undiminished after 2500 years . . . A tremendous series of books.”—Dr. Cliff Cunningham, Sun News Austin
"Polymath Paul Rahe—classicist, historian, scholar of the European Enlightenment—in this brilliant revisionist study, reminds us how Sparta, not just Athens, saved Western freedom from the Persian aggression—and did so because of its innate courage, political stability, and underappreciated genius."—Victor Davis Hanson, author of The Other Greeks and A War Like No Other
"Western civilization owes much to Athens but also, Paul Rahe argues, to Sparta. He shows how Sparta’s militaristic culture enabled it to defeat the massive Persian invasion of 480 BC, and make the flowering of ancient Greece possible."—Michael Barone, Resident Fellow, American Enterprise Institute
"The level of learning demonstrated here is high and the mastery of the source material and scholarship impressive."—Thomas Figueira, Rutgers University
"The degree of originality in this book is remarkable. Its careful, detailed description and analysis of the Spartan constitution is full of keen understandings that help explain Spartan policy, diplomacy, and strategy."—Donald Kagan, author of The Peloponnesian War
About the Author
Product details
- ASIN : B017DNAIE4
- Publisher : Yale University Press (November 24, 2015)
- Publication date : November 24, 2015
- Language : English
- File size : 12.7 MB
- Text-to-Speech : Enabled
- Screen Reader : Supported
- Enhanced typesetting : Enabled
- X-Ray : Enabled
- Word Wise : Enabled
- Print length : 425 pages
- Best Sellers Rank: #565,358 in Kindle Store (See Top 100 in Kindle Store)
- Customer Reviews:
About the author

After reading Litterae Humaniores at Wadham College, Oxford, on a Rhodes Scholarship from 1971-1974, Paul A. Rahe completed a Ph.D. in ancient history at Yale University under the direction of Donald Kagan in 1977. In subsequent years, he taught at Cornell University, Franklin and Marshall College, and the University of Tulsa, where he spent twenty-four years before accepting a position at Hillsdale College, where he is Professor of History and holds The Charles O. Lee and Louise K. Lee Chair in the Western Heritage.
Professor Rahe's entire scholarly career has been focused on two subjects: the origins and evolution of self-government within the West, and the interplay between politics, diplomacy, and war. His range is considerable. His first book, Republics Ancient and Modern: Classical Republicanism and the American Revolution (1992), was 1200 pages in length and surveyed the origins and development of self-government in ancient Greece and Rome, its re-emergence in a new form in the Middle Ages, the transformation it underwent at the hands of the political philosophers of early modernity, and the statesmanship of the American Founding Fathers. Within the first thirteen months of publication, the hardback edition sold out. Thereafter, it reappeared as an alternative selection of the History Book Club. In 1994, it was reissued in a three-volume paperback edition by the University of North Carolina Press, and it remains in print.
In the course of his career, Professor Rahe has published dozens of chapters on related subjects in edited books and scholarly articles in journals such as The American Journal of Philology, Historia, The American Journal of Archaeology, The American Historical Review, The Review of Politics, History of Political Thought, The American Journal of Business and Professional Ethics, The Journal of the Historical Society, Social Philosophy & Policy, Security Studies, The National Interest, The American Interest, and The Woodrow Wilson Quarterly. He spent two years in Istanbul, Turkey in the mid-1980s as a fellow of the Institute of Current World Affairs; he has been awarded research fellowships by the National Endowment for the Humanities and the Earhart Foundation; and he has held research fellowships at the Center for Hellenic Study, the National Humanities Center, the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, D. C. , Clare College at Cambridge University, All Souls College at Oxford University, the American Academy in Berlin, and the Hoover Institution at Stanford University; and he has given a host of public lectures at universities in the United States and abroad--most recently at the Hebrew University, at Al-Quds University, at Shalem College in Jerusalem, at the Sorbonne in Paris, at the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst in England, at the Free University in Berlin, and at the Marine Corps University in Quantico. In 1997-98, he was named to the Templeton Honor Rolls for Education in a Free Society by The John M. Templeton Foundation. In 2006 the Society for French Historical Studies awarded him the Koren Prize for the Best Article Published in French History the preceding year. In October 2019, the Mackinder Forum named his book Sparta's First Attic War: The Grand Strategy of Classical Sparta, 478-446 B.C. the book of the year for excellence in geopolitical analysis. And, in April 2022, the University of Piraeus in Athens, Greece conferred on him the Themistocles Statesmanship Award.
Professor Rahe co-edited Montesquieu's Science of Politics: Essays on the Spirit of Laws (2001) with David W. Carrithers and Michael A. Mosher, and he edited Machiavelli's Liberal Republican Legacy (2006). His second book, Against Throne and Altar: Machiavelli and Political Theory under the English Republic, which examines the political thought inspired by the abortive republican experiment that took place in England in the period stretching from 1649 to 1660, was published by Cambridge University Press in April, 2008. His third and fourth books, Montesquieu and the Logic of Liberty: War, Religion, Commerce, Climate, Terrain, Technology, Uneasiness of Mind, the Spirit of Political Vigilance, and the Foundations of the Modern Republic and Soft Despotism, Democracy's Drift: Montesquieu, Rousseau, and Tocqueville on the Modern Prospect, were published by Yale University Press in 2009.
Since that time, Professor Rahe has been working on a series of volumes focused on the grand strategy articulated and re-articulated time and again by ancient Sparta. Four of these volumes -- The Spartan Regime: Its Character, Origins, and Grand Strategy; The Grand Strategy of Classical Sparta: The Persian Challenge; Sparta's First Attic War: The Grand Strategy of Classical Sparta, 478-446 B.C.; and Sparta's Second Attic War: The Grand Strategy of Classical Sparta, 446-418 B. C.-- have been published by Yale University. Sparta's Sicilian Proxy War: The Grand Strategy of Classical Sparta, 418-413 B. C. was published by Encounter Books in September, 2023 and Sparta's Third Attic War: The Grand Strategy of Classical Sparta, 413-404 B.C. is slated for publication in 2024. He hopes to complete the series with a volume on Sparta's Imperial Venture.
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Customers praise the book's encyclopedic content, with one review highlighting its highly readable melding of historical sources and another noting how it clarifies the geopolitical and religious realities of the Persian invasion. Moreover, the narrative quality receives positive feedback, with one customer describing it as the best step-by-step account of the Persian Wars. Additionally, the writing quality is well-received, with one customer noting its clearly worded account.
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Customers praise the book's encyclopedic content, with one customer noting its highly readable melding of historical sources and another highlighting its definitive account of the Persian Wars, while another appreciates how it clarifies geopolitical and religious realities.
"In The Grand Strategy of Classical Sparta: The Persian Challenge, Paul Rahe provides the best step-by-step narrative of the Persian Wars that I have..." Read more
"...He is a master of strategy, both military and political, and he is level-headed to boot." Read more
"...It is a definitive account of the Persian Wars taking all available sources into consideration, with no detail too small for Rahe’s discerning..." Read more
"...classes in school never gave such background so that the forward story makes sense. Professor Rahe has done an amazing job!!..." Read more
Customers appreciate the narrative quality of the book, describing it as a decent history of Sparta with interesting nuggets, and one customer notes it provides the best step-by-step account of the Persian Wars.
"...: The Persian Challenge, Paul Rahe provides the best step-by-step narrative of the Persian Wars that I have ever read...." Read more
"...Rather, it is a comprehensive narrative of the Greek wars against Persia in the early fifth century BC...." Read more
"...Again, this book was decent narrative history of Sparta and the Persian Wars, but it was duplicative of items already in my collections." Read more
"...sources to tell several of the most dramatic and formative stories in Western Civilization...." Read more
Customers praise the writing of the book, with one noting its clearly worded account and another highlighting its well-structured narrative of events.
"...Rahe’s well-written narrative of events should appeal to the casual reader who is interested in Greek or Persian history...." Read more
"...Mr. Rahe is a real scholar who can write very well, and even write movingly...." Read more
"...involved with the Sparta/Athens conflicts, this is a great and well written book by Mr. Rahe...." Read more
"This is a clearly worded account of a very involved set of strategies, alliances and maneuvers that accomplished the otherwise impossible." Read more
Top reviews from the United States
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- Reviewed in the United States on September 1, 2020In The Grand Strategy of Classical Sparta: The Persian Challenge, Paul Rahe provides the best step-by-step narrative of the Persian Wars that I have ever read. He surveys the geography of the war, clarifying the terrain and seascapes of the Persian invasion and the battles almost from the point of view of an eye witness to the unfolding events. Additionally, his analysis of the motives of the actors, extraordinarily well documented from both Greek and Persian sources, lends greater clarity to the geopolitical and religious realities that motivated Xerxes, and the internecine politics that drove the Greeks to defend Greece in spite of their differences and the goals of their fractious and competitive poleis. While by no means giving Athenian concerns short shrift, Rahe departs from the traditional often largely Athenian point of view of the wars to give equal focus to Spartan and Persian strategic considerations, thus offering a more wide-range view of the various important players in the wars. Rahe’s well-written narrative of events should appeal to the casual reader who is interested in Greek or Persian history. His analysis and meticulous and extensive use of both Greek and Persian source material should also satisfy serious scholars of the subject.
- Reviewed in the United States on August 30, 2016My other option was to give this brief book 3 stars to warn off general readers (which would have been fair to those readers who like their history well written but draw a line about, for want of a better word, background). Mr. Rahe is a real scholar who can write very well, and even write movingly. He wants to explain why and how moves were made by the Persians, the Spartans, and the Athenians. To do that, and do it honestly requires time because he has to deal with not with two, but three very different cultures. Without that long ramp up, which pop-military-history buffs apparently don't enjoy very much, readers can't begin to understand moves made by any of those three cultures without knowing how the double kings came about. Nor can they understand how Themistocles in Athens maneuvered the political minefields as he did dealing with Sparta and other city-states, in order to build a fleet essentially from scratch, and also learned how to use a fleet a on the fly. The Persian culture is respected and he gives the reader an understanding of how Darius and Xerxes operated, and probably how they felt about Greek cultures. So the military narration itself is comparatively brief. But it became exciting even to me who certainly knew the basics of what was going to happen before I began to read it. I recommend it to people who know very little about the Persian wars because Mr Rahe writes very clearly, with some humor and a taste for irony. He is a master of strategy, both military and political, and he is level-headed to boot.
- Reviewed in the United States on August 11, 2018They say you shouldn’t judge a book by its cover. The same could even be said for its title. Paul Rahe’s latest effort, “The Grand Strategy of Classical Sparta: The Persian Challenge,” is an excellent book, it just doesn’t have all that much to do with the grand strategy of classical Sparta. Rather, it is a comprehensive narrative of the Greek wars against Persia in the early fifth century BC. Or as Rahe explains: “[‘The Grand Strategy of Sparta’] describes a clash of civilizations in which liberty successfully withstood the assault of despotism and a collection of diminutive and impoverished self-governing cities defeated one of the greatest empires the world has ever known.”
Before leaving the topic at hand, did the Spartans have a grand strategy? And what is “grand strategy,” anyhow? Duke political scientist Peter Feaver defined the term this way in a thoughtful essay in Foreign Policy Magazine in 2009: “Grand strategy is a term of art from academia, and refers to the collection of plans and policies that comprise the state’s deliberate effort to harness political, military, diplomatic, and economic tools together to advance that state’s national interest.” In the case of the Spartans, most of the “plans and policies” centered on the creation of a warrior elite. Everything about a young Spartan's upbringing was controlled by the state and, according to Rahe, was meant to foster “stamina, grit, endurance, and courage.” The author quotes extensively from the Spartan poet Tyrtarus, whose great works praise the virtue and valor of dying in the frontline of battle and the immortal shame of retreat. The male citizen body was “a legion of men-at-arms,” which likely never numbered more than 10,000. A permanently enslaved community of Messenians, known as Helots, who outnumbered the Spartans perhaps seven-to-one, conducted all non-military labor. Due to the constant threat of slave revolt and the relatively small number of citizen warriors, the Spartans could never afford to either venture very from their homeland on the Peloponnese nor risk losing too many of their elite soldiers in battle. All-in-all, Spartan “grand strategy” doesn’t sound all that grand.
The Athenians, on the other hand, had a grand strategy. Themistocles, the father of the vaunted Athenian navy, was reported to have said: “I cannot tune a harp or play a lyre, but I know how to make a small city great.” He wasn’t kidding. Prior to the fifth century, Athens was a minor Greek city-state in Attica of little political, military or economic importance with no history of seafaring. Themistocles would almost single-handedly change all of that. His vision was simple but incredibly bold and far-sighted. Athens would make itself a virtual island. The city would be enclosed in massive walls with a fortified corridor running nearly five miles down from the Acropolis to the harbor at Piraeus. The proceeds from a recent silver mine strike at Laurium would be used to build over 100 triremes, the most modern naval warship of the day. All political opponents to Themistocles’ grand strategy were systematically ostracized from Athens to ensure the plan was fully implemented. Contemporary military historian Eliot Cohen has recently dismissed the entire concept of grand strategy as “an idea whose time will never come, because the human condition does not permit it.” I’m generally inclined to agree with him, but the story of Themistocles and the Athenian navy is a truly remarkable exception.
The threat confronting the elite Spartan band of warriors and the upstart Athenian fleet was enormous. The Persian Empire was vast by any measure. At its height, the Persian realm, stretching across much of the modern Middle East and Central Asia, included as much as 40% of the world’s total population, more than any other empire in history up till then or since. And it aimed for more. In fact, according to Rahe, it aimed for world domination. “Universal empire was the raison d’etre of the Persian monarchy,” he writes. “It was the imperative driving the regime.” The leaders of the empire, the so-called King of Kings, “operated like spiders at the center of a great web.” They moved from one part of the empire to the other tirelessly and endlessly. For over half-a-century the kingdom enjoyed a succession of intelligent, quick-witted, and aggressive leaders: Cyrus (ruled 559-529), Cambyses (529-522), and Darius (522-486). That would come to an end with Xerxes (486-465), a man Rahe calls “weak, self-indulgent, and more than a bit of a fool.”
The Persians had received “earth and water” – a ritualistic expression of subservience – from scores of Greek communities along the eastern Aegean, making those city-states the “bandaka” of the King, the Persian word for slave, but also expressing a general dependence. These Greek states of Ionia revolted in 499. Athens came to their assistance. Arguably, this Athenian support marked the beginning of the Persian Wars. Rahe writes that Darius clearly had aims of universal empire and would have invaded Greece sooner-or-later. Others, including the Spartans, felt that the Athenians provoked the Persians. “One thing is clear,” Rahe says, “had the Ionian revolt succeeded, the Greek heartland would have been safe.” The revolt raged on for half-a-decade until the decisive naval battle of Lade in 494 off the coast of Miletus in which a large contingent of Ionian ships defected, leaving their outnumbered fellow Greeks to the mercy of a giant Persian fleet of some 600 triremes. On the issue of Athenian assistance to the Ionians, Darius would neither forgive nor forget, and the Athenians knew it.
“The Greek David could defeat the Persian Goliath,” Rahe says, “but only … if he could dictate the terms on which the contest took place.” And that is precisely what the Greeks would do time and again in the Persian War. At Marathon in 490, Miltiades ensured that the Persian cavalry, so dangerous to the hoplite phalanx, would play no role in the battle. The narrow pass at Thermopylae in 480 allowed a few hundred Spartans under their king, Leonidas, to inflict thousands of casualties on the Persians. Themistocles tricked the Persian fleet into engaging the much smaller Greek navy in the narrow waters off Salamis, negating the influence of the Persian’s superior numbers and maneuverability. Finally, the young Spartan Pausanias would do the same over the broken plains of Plataea in 479. Rarely in history has such an outnumbered force performed so well, so consistently.
Rahe relays everything with an authoritative voice and exhaustive research. This is not a popular narrative history meant for the lay-reader. It is a definitive account of the Persian Wars taking all available sources into consideration, with no detail too small for Rahe’s discerning scholarship. Consider the case of Sicinnus, the slave of Themistocles who delivered the critical message to the Persians the night before the battle of Salamis, tricking them into attacking the Greeks in the narrow straits at dawn the following morning. Here is how Rahe reviews the simple question of Sicinnus’ ethnicity and whom he delivered his message to that night: “Aeschylus reports that Sicinnus was a Greek and that he delivered Themistocles’ message to Xerxes himself. Herodotus says nothing about his nationality and implies that he met with Xerxes’ admirals but not with the Great King. Plutarch asserts that Sicinnus was of Persian extraction, and he and Diodorus presume that he met with the King of Kings. Athenaeus reports a claim that he hailed from Crete. We are left to guess at the details, and guess we will.” This is but one example of Rahe’s tireless (one might say excessive) effort to get at the truth.
The Persian Wars would loom much larger in the memory of the Greeks than that of the Persians. The defeated Persian Empire would flourish for well over another century. The events in Greece had been nothing but a sideshow so far as the King of Kings was concerned. Xerxes could – and did – emphasize the positive: the victory at Thermopylae (never mind the details); the death of the Spartan King, Leonidas; the sack of Athens; and the capture of many Greek slaves.
For the Greeks, especially the Athenians, the war had been a defining moment. The Hellenic League, cobbled together to resist “what was arguably the largest army and most formidable fleet ever assembled,” had proven a remarkable success. The Athenians slid comfortably into the role previously played by the Persians in the Aegean. The Ionian Greek city-states had merely changed one master for another, albeit a native Greek master. The annual tribute once postmarked to Susa was now payable to Athens. The maritime alliance once created to defend the Greek homeland from foreign invasion was now repurposed to defend and expand Athenian political, economic, and military hegemony from the island of Crete through the Aegean Sea and Hellespont to the rich granaries of the Black Sea. In the course of a single generation, the Athenians had transformed themselves from a community of sleepy Attic hill farmers to the most powerful naval empire the world had ever known.
Now that’s grand strategy!
- Reviewed in the United States on May 5, 2016Love this book! History classes in school never gave such background so that the forward story makes sense. Professor Rahe has done an amazing job!! Hillsdale College has a goldmine in him.
- Reviewed in the United States on September 6, 2017If you wish to delve into this part of ancient history and become involved with the Sparta/Athens conflicts, this is a great and well written book by Mr. Rahe. I purchased this book while taking a course of this subject by Mr. Rahe. But, even if you decide to read this type of history without the additional lecture, it will provide you with many aspects of this period you would never be privy to any other way.
- Reviewed in the United States on July 24, 2017This book was decent narrative history of Sparta, Ancient Greece and the Persian Wars. It did have some interesting nuggets. I won't call it a book on Sparta's "grand strategy." This is NOT a similar work to Luttwak's Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire or Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire. That was the book I was expecting based on the title, and was disappointed. Again, this book was decent narrative history of Sparta and the Persian Wars, but it was duplicative of items already in my collections.
Top reviews from other countries
- Sacred Sparta.Reviewed in the United Kingdom on July 29, 2016
5.0 out of 5 stars I enjoyed this book and I think Rahe suffers from the ...
I enjoyed this book and I think Rahe suffers from the problem all authors would experience trying to cover this period, what was the Spartan strategy when they were not exactly forward at either telling anyone (including their allies) about it or writing it down? The characteristic Spartan trait of circumspection, and obsessive (and occasionally convenient) religiosity presents a challenge to any historian and will inevitably drift more towards Athenian strategies of which there is more tangible evidence to draw on. As a Phalanx drifts to the Right this book tells us more about Athenian strategy than Spartan but that is no fault of the author, despite the gruelling outcome of the Peloponnesian war it seems history was not written by the victors.
- marco carraraReviewed in Italy on November 1, 2024
4.0 out of 5 stars Great book, misleading title
If you want to have a detailed knowledge of the Persian invasions of Greece this is your book. It’s well written, detailed and very informative and interesting. A really good piece of historical writing. The grand strategy of Sparta is just explained in few pages. It’s very clearly described but definitely its place in the book doesn’t justify the title of the book. This is the only reason for the missing fifth star in the evaluation.
- JPSReviewed in the United Kingdom on July 10, 2016
4.0 out of 5 stars Grand Strategy?
I had somewhat mixed feelings about this book. It has many qualities, but I also had a number of problems.
The main quality is that this is a narrative of Sparta that starts well before the beginning of the Persian wars with the emergence of the Persian Empire in the Middle East, but also of Sparta and its growing dominance of the Peloponnesus. One problem here is that the author has chosen to write a trilogy of which one volume is to be called “the Spartan Regime” and will focus on the city’s institutions. Accordingly, this volume only includes a rather brief overview of what could have been a key element of this book and a key component of Sparta’s so-called “Grand Strategy”. Two things are missing in particular. One is an analysis on how Sparta’s institutions evolved over time. Another is how the key institutions – the two Kings, the Gerousia and the Ephors – interacted and could come into conflict.
Another strong point is to insist upon the fact that Sparta’s foreign policy was always influenced, or perhaps dominated, by domestic considerations. In particular, Sparta always feared that its helots would revolt and take advantage of any Spartan expedition abroad to claim their independence. This is perfectly true, although not original since it can be found in the sources and the point has been made before by a number of other authors, starting with Cartledge. To the extent that the whole of Sparta’s power and dominance was predicated upon maintaining the helots in what amounted to slavery, one can wonder to what extent the expression “Grand Strategy” is an apt one.
Perhaps my main problem with this book is the author’s tendency to see the Persian Wars as part of a “clash of civilisations.” This ideological and biased view is historically wrong. Only a minority of Greek cities (thirty one out of several hundred) opposed the Persian Empire and many including all of Thessaly, Euboea and Boetia sided with the Empire. Another point which the author tends to minimise is that even within the cities that resisted, and within Athens and Sparta in particular, there was a pro-Persian faction, or at least a faction that believed that resistance was futile and submission was in the best interest of their respective cities. So, contrary to the propaganda and myths developed after the end of the Persian Wars, and the staples of popular culture that have developed ever since, there was even little unity among the Greeks opposing the invading Empire.
This, if anything, makes the ultimate victory all the more remarkable, especially since during the conflict, Sparta was very tempted to retreat, abandon Athens and only defend the Isthmus of Corinth, as some of her allies (and one of her factions) pressed her to do. The most remarkable feat here is that Sparta resisted the temptation to conceive its interests in a short-sighted way, both at Salamis and then through the Plataea campaign. It should however also be acknowledged that, in both cases, the Athenians threatened to break from the alliance and even sail away to found a new city in Italy or even reached a separate agreement if their own interests were not taken into consideration. In fact, Athens and Attica were invaded and ravaged twice by the Persians. This is also something that the author tends to minimise and which jars with his preconceived view about a “clash of civilisations” that is at best very doubtful.
Another questionable point is the author’s view of Xerxes, who is somewhat caricatured as a megalomaniac tyrant who was attempting to conquer Europe and waging some kind of religious war. Again, the author tends to be anachronistic and such views are not entirely supported by the narrative and only tell part of the story. To the extent that Eretria and Athens had actively supported the revolt of Persia’s Ionian subjects, the King of Kings had little choice than to “punish the culprits”, just like it had to punish Sparta for executing its ambassadors, which, by the way, was also something of a sacrilege.
The main point here is that while the author’s narrative does include numerous good points mixed up with shortcomings. One is to explain the withdrawal of the “Marathon expedition” by the end of the sailing season. However, with his tendency to only consider the Greek points of view, the author fails to appreciate that the expedition, which was to raid and punish those that had supported the Ionian revolt, was not a failure but a semi-success to the extent that Eretria had indeed been punished.
This points to what is perhaps the main shortcoming of this book. The story is not so much told from Sparta’s viewpoint as it is told from an essentially Greek point, leading to a somewhat biased narrative. The King of Kings decision to return to Asia is unlikely to have been an admission of failure or a move made out of fear that the Greek fleet would cut his retreat by seizing the bridges over the Hellespont. If anything, it may have been motivated by his prolonged absence from Asia and by his need to ensure that Babylonia did not once again rebel.
One last point is about the notion of “barbarian”, which the Greeks attributed to all non-Greeks in general, and to the Persians and their subject in particular. To the extent that “barbarian” was rapidly equated with “uncivilised”, the civilisations of the Persians, Phoenicians, Babylonians or Egyptians were certainly more advanced and sophisticated than that of the relatively poor and smallish city-states of Greece at the very beginning of the Fifth century BC.
So despite the fact that the book is well written, easy to read and well supported by numerous and good maps, and despite the fact that it also includes useful elements on the early development of the city-states of Sparta but also of Athens, I can only give this book a somewhat generous four stars, although three stars and a half would perhaps be more accurate.