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Rome Spreads Her Wings: Territorial Expansion Between the Punic Wars Kindle Edition

by Gareth C. Sampson (Author) Format: Kindle Edition
4.4 4.4 out of 5 stars 20 ratings
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The two decades between the end of the First Punic War and the beginning of the Second represent a key period in the development of Romes imperial ambitions, both within Italy and beyond. Within Italy, Rome faced an invasion of Gauls from Northern Italy, which threatened the very existence of the Roman state. This war culminated at the Battle of Telamon and the final Roman victory against the Gauls of Italy, giving Rome control of the peninsula up to the Alps for the first time in her history. Beyond the shores of Italy, Rome acquired her first provinces, in the form of Sardinia and Corsica, established footholds in Sicily and Spain and crossed the Adriatic to establish a presence on the Greek mainland, bringing Rome into the orbit of the Hellenistic World. Yet this period is often treated as nothing more than an intermission between the two better known Punic Wars, with each Roman campaign being made seemingly in anticipation of a further conflict with Carthage. Such a view overlooks two key factors that emerge from these decades: firstly, that Rome faced a far graver threat in the form of the Gauls of Northern Italy than she had faced at the hands of the Carthaginians in the First Punic War; secondly, that the foundations for Romes overseas empire were laid in these very decades. This work seeks to redress the balance and view these wars in their own right, analyse how close Rome came to being defeated in Italy and asses the importance of these decades as a key period in the foundation of Romes future empire.
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  1. Print length
    321 pages
  2. Language
    English
  3. Sticky notes
    On Kindle Scribe
  4. Publisher
    Pen & Sword Military
  5. Publication date
    June 19, 2016
  6. File size
    5091 KB
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Editorial Reviews

Review

"But as a work intended primarily for a popular audience, Sampson is successful in presenting a vivid narrative of Roman expansion from 241-218."
Res Militares

About the Author

After a successful career in corporate finance, Dr. Gareth Sampson returned to the study of ancient Rome and gained his PhD from the University of Manchester, where he currently teaches ancient history. He has made a detailed study of early Roman political history and in particular the political office of the tribunate of the plebs. He is currently engaged in a study of the power struggles and the civil warfare of the late Republic and its expansionist policies in the east.

Product details

  • ASIN ‏ : ‎ B01GPQVIUS
  • Publisher ‏ : ‎ Pen & Sword Military (June 19, 2016)
  • Publication date ‏ : ‎ June 19, 2016
  • Language ‏ : ‎ English
  • File size ‏ : ‎ 5091 KB
  • Text-to-Speech ‏ : ‎ Enabled
  • Screen Reader ‏ : ‎ Supported
  • Enhanced typesetting ‏ : ‎ Enabled
  • X-Ray ‏ : ‎ Not Enabled
  • Word Wise ‏ : ‎ Enabled
  • Sticky notes ‏ : ‎ On Kindle Scribe
  • Print length ‏ : ‎ 321 pages
  • Customer Reviews:
    4.4 4.4 out of 5 stars 20 ratings

Customer reviews

4.4 out of 5 stars
4.4 out of 5
20 global ratings

Top reviews from the United States

Jshaw
5.0 out of 5 stars History of Roman expansion
Reviewed in the United States on November 22, 2019
Verified Purchase
Well written and researched.
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Alexandra Buckley
2.0 out of 5 stars Interesting history, but reads like an unedited draft
Reviewed in the United States on December 6, 2016
Verified Purchase
Gareth Sampson's review of the interwar period between the First and Second Punic Wars covers an often overlooked but incredibly important period of Roman history. However, the amount of simple spelling and grammar rules are incredibly distracting and assault his credibility as an author. Reads as if it was a first draft that never made it to an actual editor before publication. Amateur maps that might have been drawn using Microsoft Paint, and paragraphs that are at a high school level. If you can look past that, however, it's a good book, but it was hard to look past that.
One person found this helpful
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JPS
4.0 out of 5 stars Between the Punic wars
Reviewed in the United States on July 14, 2016
Review first posted on amazon.co.uk on 19 June 2016 (hardcover book)

The purpose of this book is to fill in a gap and – according the author at least - somewhat set the record straight. Despite some repetitions, the book is relatively easy to read and accessible.

The first contention is that the importance of the period from 241 BC to 219 BC has been largely underestimated by both Ancient sources and most modern authors as well. This is largely true, although there have been a number of pieces of scholarship which have largely addressed and corrected this over the last fifteen to twenty years so that, in practice, the gap being addressed is largely that still existing in the Pen & Sword collection itself. The period did, as well shown be the author, see Rome “spread her wings” as it acquired its first province in the aftermath of the First Punic war (Sicily), followed by Sardinia and Corsica and a protectorate in Illyria. However, it also saw Rome put an end once and for all to the major threat represented by the Gallic tribes settled north of the Po.

While this is true, at least to some extent, the author’s second contention, that the Gallic threat to Rome’s northern frontier and to the sheer existence to Rome was a larger one than Carthage, is more disputable. The author makes some excellent points when showing to what extent the trauma of the Gallic victory and sac of Rome more than 150 years ago still loomed large in the Roman psyche. Accordingly, he may very well be correct when considering that, from Rome’s perspective, the main menace between 240 and 225 BC was not that of a resurging Carthage but that of a Gallic onslaught, and he makes a mostly convincing case to support this view.

There is however a major weakness in this case. This arises when the author contends that the mass formed by Gallic Northern Italy and Gaul did have the manpower reserves to take on Rome, contrary to Carthage. The problem with this argument is that Gaul, both Transalpine and Cisalpine parts of it, was anything but united. It can therefore absolutely not be compared to the Roman Federation and not even to the Carthaginian dominions. In fact, the author shows that it is largely because of this disunion that Rome was able to successfully play “divide and conquer” (allying with some tribes against others) and was also able, through sustained campaigning, to wear down the main tribes of Northern Italy one after the other. He also shows that the (mercenary) support that these tribes could expect from their “cousins” from North of the Alps was fickle and not exactly reliable, therefore somewhat contradicting his main case.

Despite this, there are many very valuable elements. One is to show how the Roman Senate’s thinking seems to have evolved, with the acquisition of provinces and footholds surrounding Italy, completed by allies that were as many outposts and acting as buffers. While the sources do not specifically back up such a statement, it is nevertheless quite a plausible hypothesis. Another interest consideration is that the Romans’ Illyrian incursions both took place at times when the Macedonian Kingdom was in crisis, showing how careful the Romans were when choosing the time to step, assert themselves and take advantage of a vacuum rather than to confront yet another powerful enemy.

Another valuable piece, which largely builds on Hoyos’ work, is about the Carthaginians in Spain and the strategic aims of the three Barcid warlords. Again, and while this is not explicitly backed by primary sources, Hamilcar, Hasdrubal and Hannibal, backed by a majority at home, seem to have clearly identified the need to build up financial resources that were not mostly reliant on trade and to build up the manpower reserves that they could draw upon in the event of another conflict. Another point that is also well-made is to show that the Romans did nothing to support Saguntum and were in fact preparing for a Second Punic war that would take place in Spain.

Also included is an interesting (even if not original) analysis of the surviving sources, showing how much has been lost and perhaps also to what extent what has survived may have influenced and distorted the record.

Four strong stars for a valuable book that does fill a gap, even if only for so-called general readers and even if some of the author’s claims may seem a bit exaggerated and not entirely convincing.

For those interested in some of the scholarly works on the Gauls in Italy that the author has used and referenced, I can recommend the following (there are others referenced by the author but I have not read them): “Beyond the Rubicon. Romans and Gauls in Republican Italy” by J. Williams (Oxford, 2001).
12 people found this helpful
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Michael Herndon
5.0 out of 5 stars Great Read!
Reviewed in the United States on May 31, 2019
Verified Purchase
Great read on the early-mid years of Rome!
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Top reviews from other countries

Ms Indy Mair
5.0 out of 5 stars Five Stars
Reviewed in the United Kingdom on March 26, 2018
Verified Purchase
Just what was wanted... thanks!
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JPS
4.0 out of 5 stars Between the Punic Wars
Reviewed in the United Kingdom on June 19, 2016
Verified Purchase
The purpose of this book is to fill in a gap and – according the author at least - somewhat set the record straight. Despite some repetitions, the book is relatively easy to read and accessible.

The first contention is that the importance of the period from 241 BC to 219 BC has been largely underestimated by both Ancient sources and most modern authors as well. This is largely true, although there have been a number of pieces of scholarship which have largely addressed and corrected this over the last fifteen to twenty years so that, in practice, the gap being addressed is largely that still existing in the Pen & Sword collection itself. The period did, as well shown be the author, see Rome “spread her wings” as it acquired its first province in the aftermath of the First Punic war (Sicily), followed by Sardinia and Corsica and a protectorate in Illyria. However, it also saw Rome put an end once and for all to the major threat represented by the Gallic tribes settled north of the Po.

While this is true, at least to some extent, the author’s second contention, that the Gallic threat to Rome’s northern frontier and to the sheer existence to Rome was a larger one than Carthage, is more disputable. The author makes some excellent points when showing to what extent the trauma of the Gallic victory and sac of Rome more than 150 years ago still loomed large in the Roman psyche. Accordingly, he may very well be correct when considering that, from Rome’s perspective, the main menace between 240 and 225 BC was not that of a resurging Carthage but that of a Gallic onslaught, and he makes a mostly convincing case to support this view.

There is however a major weakness in this case. This arises when the author contends that the mass formed by Gallic Northern Italy and Gaul did have the manpower reserves to take on Rome, contrary to Carthage. The problem with this argument is that Gaul, both Transalpine and Cisalpine parts of it, was anything but united. It can therefore absolutely not be compared to the Roman Federation and not even to the Carthaginian dominions. In fact, the author shows that it is largely because of this disunion that Rome was able to successfully play “divide and conquer” (allying with some tribes against others) and was also able, through sustained campaigning, to wear down the main tribes of Northern Italy one after the other. He also shows that the (mercenary) support that these tribes could expect from their “cousins” from North of the Alps was fickle and not exactly reliable, therefore somewhat contradicting his main case.

Despite this, there are many very valuable elements. One is to show how the Roman Senate’s thinking seems to have evolved, with the acquisition of provinces and footholds surrounding Italy, completed by allies that were as many outposts and acting as buffers. While the sources do not specifically back up such a statement, it is nevertheless quite a plausible hypothesis. Another interest consideration is that the Romans’ Illyrian incursions both took place at times when the Macedonian Kingdom was in crisis, showing how careful the Romans were when choosing the time to step, assert themselves and take advantage of a vacuum rather than to confront yet another powerful enemy.

Another valuable piece, which largely builds on Hoyos’ work, is about the Carthaginians in Spain and the strategic aims of the three Barcid warlords. Again, and while this is not explicitly backed by primary sources, Hamilcar, Hasdrubal and Hannibal, backed by a majority at home, seem to have clearly identified the need to build up financial resources that were not mostly reliant on trade and to build up the manpower reserves that they could draw upon in the event of another conflict. Another point that is also well-made is to show that the Romans did nothing to support Saguntum and were in fact preparing for a Second Punic war that would take place in Spain.

Also included is an interesting (even if not original) analysis of the surviving sources, showing how much has been lost and perhaps also to what extent what has survived may have influenced and distorted the record.

Four strong stars for a valuable book that does fill a gap, even if only for so-called general readers and even if some of the author’s claims may seem a bit exaggerated and not entirely convincing.

For those interested in some of the scholarly works on the Gauls in Italy that the author has used and referenced, I can recommend the following (there are others referenced by the author but I have not read them): “Beyond the Rubicon. Romans and Gauls in Republican Italy” by J. Williams (Oxford, 2001).
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