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We Have Not a Government: The Articles of Confederation and the Road to the Constitution Kindle Edition
In 1783, as the Revolutionary War came to a close, Alexander Hamilton resigned in disgust from the Continental Congress after it refused to consider a fundamental reform of the Articles of Confederation. Just four years later, that same government collapsed, and Congress grudgingly agreed to support the 1787 Philadelphia Constitutional Convention, which altered the Articles beyond recognition. What occurred during this remarkably brief interval to cause the Confederation to lose public confidence and inspire Americans to replace it with a dramatically more flexible and powerful government? We Have Not a Government is the story of this contentious moment in American history.
At the time, America was a sharply divided country. Amid a deep, long-lasting recession, the Confederation faced massive war debts and experienced punishing trade restrictions and strong resistance to American territorial expansion. Exploding western settlement led to bitter sectional divisions that deadlocked the Continental Congress. Van Cleve shows how these remarkable stresses transformed the Confederation into a stalemate government and eventually led previously conflicting states, sections, and interest groups to advocate for a union powerful enough to govern a continental empire.
Touching on the stories of a wide-ranging cast of characters—including John Adams, Patrick Henry, Daniel Shays, George Washington, and Thayendanegea—Van Cleve makes clear that it was the Confederation’s failures that created a political crisis and led to the 1787 Constitution. Clearly argued and superbly written, We Have Not a Government is a must-read history of this crucial period in our nation’s early life.
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Editorial Reviews
Review
"With careful attention and rich research, this book examines in depth each of the ways that the Confederation failed." -- David O. Stewart ― Washington Independent Review of Books
. . . a new and well-researched account of the policies and events that ultimately led to a loss of public confidence in the Articles of Confederation’s ability to govern a sectionally divided America. . . . [Van Cleve argues that] Political collapse, rather than imminent financial collapse, caused America’s leaders to lose faith in the Confederation’s ability to govern. ― Tulsa Law Review
“We Have Not a Government provides a focused explanation of the reasons the Articles of Confederation, the nation’s first federal constitution, went lurching toward collapse. . . .Van Cleve patiently examines the specific matters of public policy that vexed national politics in the mid-1780s. He draws sharp conclusions and generally takes decided stands on matters that historians still actively dispute. . . .What Van Cleve does demonstrate, persuasively, is that the genuine crisis of the Confederation required creating a “staggeringly powerful” national government through a “grand bargain” that went well beyond what any state might have asked for itself.” -- Jack Rakove, Pulitzer Prize winner ― Washington Post
Review
About the Author
Excerpt. © Reprinted by permission. All rights reserved.
We Have Not a Government
The Articles of Confederation and the Road to the Constitution
By George William Van CleveThe University of Chicago Press
Copyright © 2017 The University of ChicagoAll rights reserved.
ISBN: 978-0-226-48050-3
Contents
Principal Characters,The Confederation's Final Years: A Chronology,
Introduction,
PART ONE THE SEARCH FOR NATIONAL IDENTITY,
1 War's Aftermath,
2 Americans and Postwar Debts: Public Faith or Anarchy?,
3 Republic and Empire: The Struggle over Confederation Taxes,
4 Protecting American Commerce in an Imperial World,
PART TWO WESTERN EXPANSION STRAINS,
5 "Astonishing" Emigrations and Western Conflicts,
6 The Spanish-Treaty Impasse and the Union's Collapse,
PART THREE INTERNAL DIVISIONS: STATE SOCIAL CONFLICTS,
7 Economic Relief, Social Peace, and Republican Justice,
8 Shays's Rebellion: The Final Battle of the American Revolution?,
PART FOUR CONFEDERATION COLLAPSE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES,
9 "The Truth Is, We Have Not a Government": Confederation Stalemate and the Road to the Philadelphia Convention,
Conclusion: The Birth of the American Empire,
Epilogue,
Acknowledgments,
Abbreviations,
Notes,
Bibliography,
Index,
Footnotes,
CHAPTER 1
War's Aftermath
By early 1783, the United States was nearing independence after its eight-year war against Great Britain. Over the next several years, Americans struggled to rebuild their country and to engage with the wider European imperial world. In doing so, they faced a series of formidable economic and political obstacles.
Although America emerged victorious, the war had been deeply traumatic, and it had fundamentally altered American society. Tens of thousands of soldiers had been killed, wounded, or disabled. Many innocent civilians' lives had been shattered. America's economy was severely damaged. Many people's fortunes had been altered dramatically. Soldiers, women, artisans, and the "middling sort" (people situated between the gentry and the poor) increasingly viewed themselves as entitled to equal participation in politics. Several states' political cultures had become more democratic.
The war's end left the Confederation with heavy burdens and facing significant threats. To fight Britain, it had been forced to go deeply into debt. By early 1783, many creditors were pressing it for payment, especially its disgruntled army. American leaders were sharply divided over the Confederation's wartime performance and about how much peacetime power and resources it needed. The 1783 Treaty of Peace greatly expanded the United States' boundaries, causing many people to dream that it would become a continental empire. But the peace terms had strong enemies in Britain, other major European powers, and Native Americans. The treaty's apparently liberal terms concealed important threats to American expansion at home and abroad.
Adding to the Confederation's troubles, after the war America experienced a severe and long-lasting economic recession. Export incomes slumped drastically below prewar levels. Americans endured sharply falling prices for goods, land, and commodities, skyrocketing interest rates, and extreme money scarcity. Thousands of people lost their jobs, farms, or homes. Thousands migrated westward under economic duress. This divisive economic maelstrom became a prominent feature of the environment in which the Confederation and the states were forced to govern.
* * *
Poor America is prepared for peace, indeed it may be said that she is prepared for nothing else.
Congressman Abner Nash to James Iredell, January 17831
War, Economy, and Society
Philadelphia merchant Robert Morris was one of America's most prominent and wealthy international businessmen during the revolutionary era. Many of the Revolution's leaders saw him as an opponent of republican popular government and regarded him with distrust at best. Despite that, his strong financial reputation had led Congress in 1781 unanimously to appoint him as the Confederation's superintendent of finance. As superintendent, his most important responsibility during the Revolutionary War was to obtain funds to supply and pay America's army.
In January 1783, Morris faced a problem that threatened to destroy the Confederation. On January 6, the army's representatives presented a petition to Congress demanding payment of a large amount of money owed to it. Morris had no money to pay the army, and knew that if the troops were not paid, they might revolt. On January 10, he met secretly with a congressional committee. He admitted that he had already written checks for 3.5 million French livres (more than $600,000) that the Confederation did not have. That had been a profound violation of Morris's strongly held principles, one that threatened to damage severely both his and the Confederation's credit. Now he felt he had no choice but to take an even more desperate step for which he wanted Congress's approval. Morris told the committee that despite having no funds, he planned to write additional checks for large sums to pay the army some of what it was owed. He hoped that they might be covered by a new European loan before they came due, but could give no assurances. Seeing no alternative to avoid disaster, the committee approved Morris's plan. Since taking office in 1781, Morris had been forced to finance the Revolutionary War largely on credit. Now he had been reduced to hoping that the government might obtain more credit, though it already had at least $35 million in war debts.
The Confederation's growing debt problem was an important sign that the war had inflicted major damage on the United States. It had exacted a large, long-lasting human toll, and caused significant economic damage. In another wholly unexpected series of developments, the war also set in motion a substantial democratization of American government and society, and caused critical political divisions.
THE RAVAGES OF WAR
The land war had been fought all across America, from the seacoast to the western frontiers. To fight it, America mobilized what one historian regards as the first modern popular army. An estimated two hundred thousand Americans, or about one-third of the military-age free male population, served in the Continental army or state militias. The army mixed social classes. Most officers were men of the gentry, including substantial landowners, or of the middling sort. Common soldiers, on the other hand, were often conscripts. They were typically poor, landless young men who often came from recent immigrant groups such as the Irish. Some five thousand African Americans, including slaves, also served. At least twenty thousand women worked to support the Continental army. Historians estimate that twenty-five to thirty-five thousand American soldiers died in battle and in prison, of disease or of wounds. By way of comparison, that would represent a loss of about three million American lives today.
British troops captured major cities such as Charleston and New York. They burned others, including Norfolk (with American help), New London, Groton, and Falmouth, as well as homes and plantations. A British officer justified the burning of Fairfield, Connecticut, including its churches, as a way to cause "a general Terror and despondency." British forces captured more than eleven hundred American ships, while American privateers captured more than twenty-three hundred British ships. From 1777 to 1781, roughly one hundred thousand British and American troops lived off of firewood, crops, and livestock that were requisitioned, or in some cases plundered, from farmers around the country.
The war caused widespread misery. By its end, thousands of families had had their lives permanently disrupted by its harsh realities, including death, disability, rape, separations, flight, and impoverishment. Some families lost more than one member. Mary Jones wrote from South Carolina to her brother in 1785 that she had been forced away from her plantation for two years "by means of the Enemy" and that she had lost two sons. "One was taken prisoner and murdred and other died with his Wounds. ... I was very much Distresd before I was drove away." In 1782, John Barnam sought furlough from his Connecticut regiment to help his aged parents with the harvest. He supported his request by saying that his two sisters' husbands had both apparently died in service.
The Revolutionary War was also a civil war. Popular opinion on the war was split between ardent American patriots, neutralists, and Loyalists to varying degrees in different parts of the country. Friends and families were sometimes divided. Historian Patrick Griffin describes the war in South Carolina in 1780 and 1781, for example, as a series of "skirmishes, raids, and appalling violence and humiliation," where battles often involved neighbors. Forces on both sides often gave no quarter, relentlessly executing their vanquished opponents.
The war at times descended into utterly lawless torture and murder that made a mockery of the idea that war could ever be civilized. In the West, American vigilantes brutally massacred Native Americans, some of whom were neutrals with no British connection (several tribes did fight with Britain). In reprisal, Native Americans murdered settlers. General Henry Knox provided assistance in 1782 to twenty-two American women and children from the Virginia and Pennsylvania frontiers whose husbands and fathers had been murdered, and who had then been taken prisoner. He euphemistically described them as "having experienced horrors unutterable" during captivity, a phrase intended to convey that they had been gravely abused.
Loyalist and British atrocities in certain parts of the country caused enormous, long-lasting bitterness. Hugh Williamson, a doctor and member of Congress, wrote to an acquaintance in England after the war that when he served in the army, "I have seen the Enemy hang up our people in Dozens ... I have seen them destroy with the Bayonet multitudes of cripled men & men who had surrendered, and have ... seen them treat hundreds of prisoners in such a manner as to secure their Death." American diplomat John Jay described the "greater part" of the Tories as "inhuman, barbarous wretches." Tens of thousands of Loyalists fled America by war's end. They reportedly removed more than £1.5 million from New York alone as they left.
But the war's ravages were felt unevenly across the country. As historian Stephen Conway concluded, there were whole areas of the United States that either were lightly touched by war or escaped its ravages completely. Rhode Island, for example, was occupied by British forces for three years, and its shipping was essentially destroyed. In 1774, Newport sent out nearly 140 vessels; in 1782, it sent out "not more than 5 or 6." Pennsylvania, on the other hand, was unoccupied between mid-1778 and 1783, as was much of the North. Some backcountry areas, such as those in Virginia, were also comparatively insulated. Two Virginia entrepreneurs, John Lewis and John Oliver, in 1779 created a seven-year partnership to run a plantation and a public house to entertain travelers who "resort the Baths for the use of the waters" at Warm Springs in the Blue Ridge Mountains. When the British made their ill-fated invasion of Virginia in 1781, they never got near the resort or most of the state's western half.
Still other areas suffered severe, comparatively long-lasting damage. A British observer, James Simpson, reported two months after Charleston's capture that he could only believe so much devastation had occurred so quickly in a previously wealthy area because he had seen it personally. One historian concludes that destruction and impoverishment in South Carolina were so great that the state was "nearly submerged by the British tide." Perhaps twenty thousand slaves fled masters, mainly from southern plantations. Overall, another historian concludes, the South suffered considerably greater losses than the North, and they came later in the war. In addition to physical infrastructure damage, the war caused a variety of other economic losses.
During the war, American exports plummeted, reducing incomes significantly, especially in coastal areas. Chesapeake tobacco exports fell roughly 90 percent from prewar levels by the early 1780s, and Carolina rice exports to Britain had dropped 80 percent by then. Philadelphia shipping tonnage dropped more than 90 percent by 1779. Before the war, America's four largest cities — Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and Charleston — had 5.1 percent of the country's population. In 1790, those cities had less than 3 percent of the population, indicating that their relative prosperity had declined compared to the prewar period.
The war caused other significant economic disruptions. The Confederation issued about $241 million in paper money (the opposite of "specie" or "hard money," i.e., gold or silver coin). One historian estimates that that amount was larger than the entire American gross domestic product at the time. The unintended result of issuing large quantities of paper money at a time of widespread shortages of goods was massive inflation. In Maryland, for example, the price of foodstuffs went up between 1,900 percent and 5,000 percent between 1777 and 1780. Samuel Adams paid $2,000 in Boston in 1779 for a suit of clothes. A single horse was sold for $12,000 in 1781 in North Carolina.
Ultimately, the total Confederation paper issue was exchanged for roughly 20 percent of its face value in specie equivalent before becoming worthless. The states also issued more than $200 million in paper money, and by late 1780, most of it was essentially worthless as well. Maryland currency, for example, traded at one hundred Maryland dollars for one Spanish dollar by then. In some cases, despite such depreciation, paper money was required by law to be accepted at its face value, no matter what it was actually worth on the market in specie (i.e., it was made "legal tender"). Merchants complained that wartime paper-money and legal-tender laws had had unfair results.
Leading Philadelphia merchant Stephen Collins explained in disgust to a London correspondent after the war that a Pennsylvania estate for which he was the executor had been sharply reduced in value because he had been forced by law to accept paper money worth little in full payment of far larger debts to it. To another British correspondent he wrote that "the War has been a disagreeable and ruinous affair to the trading Interest of this Country, as well from the great Risque, and many captures at Sea, as the destructive Consequences arising from the great and rapid Depreciation, and next kin to a final Destruction of the paper Money, by which many are greatly injur'd, & some totally ruined." In addition to numerous merchants who suffered losses, several other groups had reason to be unhappy about the war's costs to them by the time peace arrived.
One important disgruntled group was America's returning veterans. The Confederation had supported its army poorly during the war. One historian concludes that "soldiers and officers received virtually nothing" in pay in 1781–82. He says that that "relieved" the Confederation of an expense of at least $3.5 million a year, which he thinks was "necessary to maintain solvency in other areas." Soldiers' families had to shift for themselves. George Washington described the army to his fellow general, Nathanael Greene, as "composed of Men oftentimes half starved; always in Rags, without pay, and experiencing, at times, every species of distress which human nature is capable of undergoing." He said that future historians would have trouble believing that an army in that condition could possibly have won the war.
General Greene would undoubtedly have agreed with Washington's description. He later explained that he had spent $40,000 on clothing for his troops in 1782 because several hundred "had been as naked as they were born ... for more than four months, and the enemy in force within four hours march of us all." In 1782, North Carolina's congressmen had written to Governor Alexander Martin that "never was an army worse paid than they have been and are, to say nothing of their cloathes & rations." Because they were paid poorly or not at all, many soldiers became involuntary "public creditors" of the states and the Confederation. As we will see, the parsimonious treatment that ordinary soldiers received during and after the war led many of them to become discontented with both the Confederation and their own state governments.
Another unhappy group consisted of farmers who had been unwilling participants in the war. They supplied the American army or militias and were promised repayment, thus also becoming public creditors. Later they often felt that they had received little real compensation. In Virginia, Shenandoah Valley farmers alone supplied at least 232,000 pounds of flour and 566,000 pounds of beef to the government between 1781 and 1783. In exchange, they received state debt certificates that were usually worth only a small fraction of their face value on the market. In 1784, some of these farmers petitioned the Virginia legislature, complaining that they had not been paid for their livestock and crops, which were "our only dependance for the support of ourselves and familys." Instead, for their goods and personal services they had been given "a Species of paper — Specie which will pay nothing but the Redemption of itself and of consequence No Restitution at all." Unable for lack of hard money (i.e., actual specie) to pay either "private debts or publick Tax," they requested that they be able to use the state debts owed to them (i.e., their state debt certificates) to pay both. Not surprisingly, other farmers, such as those in New Jersey, hid their cattle from the army rather than have them exchanged for government debt certificates of far less value. Still others, notably from Connecticut, engaged in traitorous smuggling to sell goods to New York British forces who would pay hard money for them, defying army interdiction efforts.
(Continues...)Excerpted from We Have Not a Government by George William Van Cleve. Copyright © 2017 The University of Chicago. Excerpted by permission of The University of Chicago Press.
All rights reserved. No part of this excerpt may be reproduced or reprinted without permission in writing from the publisher.
Excerpts are provided by Dial-A-Book Inc. solely for the personal use of visitors to this web site.
Product details
- ASIN : B075PBGCS1
- Publisher : The University of Chicago Press; Reprint edition (October 13, 2017)
- Publication date : October 13, 2017
- Language : English
- File size : 3.1 MB
- Text-to-Speech : Enabled
- Screen Reader : Supported
- Enhanced typesetting : Enabled
- X-Ray : Not Enabled
- Word Wise : Enabled
- Print length : 412 pages
- Best Sellers Rank: #97,737 in Kindle Store (See Top 100 in Kindle Store)
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About the author

George William Van Cleve is Dean's Visiting Scholar, Georgetown University Law Center. He was formerly Research Professor in Law and History, Seattle University School of Law. PhD, University of Virginia; JD, Harvard Law School.
In 2017, he published We Have Not a Government: The Articles of Confederation and the Road to the Constitution. For a video of his talk on that book at the U.S. National Archives, see https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SBZP8PxmGuw.
In 2020, he published Making a New American Constitution, a book on why the United States Constitution needs major reforms and how we can make them.
His hobbies include mountain hiking, biking, and reading.
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- Reviewed in the United States on January 12, 2023History classes and even Revolutionary-era biographies too often gloss over the ill-fated (and ill-suited) Articles of Confederation. Understanding those years where the US was governed by these weak Articles of important to truly understanding the genius of the Constitution. Well written but probably more dense and fact-filled than a casual reader would want, but very thorough for those who really wish to understand this era.
- Reviewed in the United States on January 12, 2020Avery interesting read on a little examined period of American history.
- Reviewed in the United States on July 14, 2018Interesting, well-researched book discussing the "Confederation" period between the end of the Revolutionary War and the Constitutional Convention of 1787. The book provides compelling evidence that the Constitution was not merely an effort by wealthy elites to protect their status and property against "leveling" influences but, instead, was a pragmatic response to the multiple defects of the Articles of Confederation (e.g., inability to pay Revolutionary War domestic and foreign debts and maintain public credit, inability to resolve interstate and sectional conflicts, inability to protect or govern western settlers, inability to deal with British and Spanish intrigues). An excellent book describing this perilous period of American history.
- Reviewed in the United States on January 26, 2018The complete Articles as originally written - and interpreted. A perfect resource for my Civics students.
- Reviewed in the United States on June 25, 2018This is a great book that goes over that period between the end of the revolution and the beginning of the federal government. Why did we make this change? How bad was our confederacy? These were questions I always wondered about and now I know.
The book is dry but engaging. It is laid out in easy to follow sections. I have no complaints and highly recommend it.
- Reviewed in the United States on June 19, 2019I choose the book as I wanted to learn the important issues facing the country that lead to the 1787 constitutional convention before reading Gordon's book on the convention debates. Up to the epilogue, the book fulfilled my expectations. However, I give the epilogue no more than a star due to his interjection of a personal present-day bias. It's certainly his prerogative as the author, but for me has no place in an otherwise well presented historical perspective of the failure of the Confederation.
- Reviewed in the United States on March 22, 2018Very true but dry and not quite what I was looking for. There wasn't much on how the Articles of Confederation were ratified.
- Reviewed in the United States on February 9, 2020This is a good book that tells of the period after the War for Independence leading up to the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia. The government of the colonies was a Confederation. The author makes a good case for why this government was considered dysfunctional and needed to be changed. This is not without a certain bias towards the ones he labels "nationalists" and against the Federalists. (The terms Federalist and anti-Federalist switched during the time of the Convention.) The author is dismissive of the counter arguments that the system could have worked out.
The case is well-made that the new goverment was ham-strung with heavy debts to Britain, former soldiers, and others. There was the issue of the states not wanting or able to help pay those debts as they had problems of their own. Add to this the great migration westwards and Spain closing the Mississippi River to American shipping. Another addition would be the issue of clashes with Native American tribes.
As another reviewer has commented, the author reveals a certain agenda in the Epilogue by saying the Constitution was flawed because of the equal state representation in the Senate. This leaves out the proportionate representation of the House. The bicameral Legislature was a design that preserved the equal state representation of the Confederation and the Constitution might not have been ratified without it. But some who give the California versus Wyoming example like the author and like Bill Maher in a recent interview with Steve Bannon (2.7.20), want one state or a small group of states to dominate the entire country. They want to win when in fact that is not what a national government is about. They are fans of collectivism.
Top reviews from other countries
- Jacob la CourReviewed in the United Kingdom on June 26, 2020
5.0 out of 5 stars A book every American should read
Every time a debate arises about the US constitution, electoral college etc, the usual statement from Americans is that their Founders were demi-god-like geniouses who drafted the most perfect constitution. But seen from Europe that is clearly not so. Knowing the background and process it is very clear that it was based on a specific set of facts and a compromise between conflicting interests. Contrary to what DGR states in his/her review, I found the epilogue very important - that the constitution might have been great in 1787 between 13 states, but does not work in 2020 between 50 states of hugely different sizes where a government unable to make decisions is worse than the risk of "majority tyranny".