In contrast to other philosophers who have written on the topic of religious experience, Stace is a perennialist, searching for a meaningful way to discuss the similarities between documented cases of religious experience. He begins with this assumption, which to me seems like an intuitive place to start (as opposed to Katz. See "Language, Epistemology and Mysticism") so like-minded readers may be drawn to his methods. Although this may seem like a very good place to start an inquiry into "mysticism," upon closer inspection, his method leaves much to be desired.First and foremost, Stace makes little distinction between "experience" and "interpretation." From the philosophy of mind, thinkers who wrote a few decades after Stace, such as Levine (see "Materialism and Qualia: The Explanatory Gap"), Nagel (see "What is it Like to be a Bat?") and Jackson (see "Epiphenomenal Qualia") have presented powerful cases concerning the vast and potentially unbridgeable gap between experience and its interpretation. I won't reiterate Stace's position here, but ultimately we have to ask; "What is accomplished by defining the "universal core" of religious experience linguistically when there is such a disparity between experience and the theories we use to explain it?" Can this be casually overlooked especially considering the "ineffable" nature of the experience? I do not fault Stace for not mentioning this due to the era in which he wrote, but this is a critique that needs serious attention. Compounding this point is the fact that Stace has had no religious experience of his own making it all the more dubious that he could make that which is by definition beyond human understanding meaningful.Stace also omits non-dual logic systems that seem more apt at addressing self-annihilation and religious experience (i.e., as found in the Diamond Sutra) than does the discourse of either/or logic. When discussing an "experience" in the rational sense where a grammatical subject and predicate are required, what can one seriously take Eckhart to mean when he asks God to rid him of all concepts of God while at the same time striving for his own annihilation? (see Sermon 52) Also, to profess to have such a position that stands outside of both subject and object is metaphysical speculation. To force a grammatical subject and object onto an experience that is calling for neither seems to be akin to forcing a square peg through a round hole. Or, as a wiser man than I once wrote, and I paraphrase, "It is as if Stace has a star-shaped cookie cutter, presses it into the dough of religious experience and then claims that the dough is star-shaped."We also need to keep in mind that Stace speaks only incidentally of the body, which is to be expected considering the methodology of analytic philosophy. By doing so, he reduces religious experience to language, negating both the body and the unconscious. It is through the body and in the body that religious experience is cultivated and received. Also, the role of concentration on the breath which through prolonged focus in meditation and prayer bridges the conscious and unconscious is not mention in any way. I think that for a more full picture of this "universal core," attention to both the body and the unconscious is needed.I would next like to critique Stace's use of the categories of "extroverted" and "introverted." He seems to use these in a phenomenological sense, roughly correlated to "inner" and "outer," but he gives little attention to clarification. It seems that floating between these two perspectives is a "self," which when discovered is the end-all of religious experience (much to the chagrin of Buddhism). He seems to have some initial insight to make this distinction, but he seems to take this for granted. I think that much insight can be gained by translating Stace's use of these terms into the typology of Jung. By doing so, I believe that much of Stace's agenda is exposed. For example, I think it is clear that Stace is some form of introverted, intuitive thinker, probably emphasizing the thinking due to his profession and method. His intuition is also evident by his perennialist's nature. As he is a philosopher, he finds truth in systematization, which I believe explains why Stace strongly favors other mystics who were intellectual enough to systemize their work. This bias is all the more evident where in the book Stace ridicules and insults Teresa of Avila for her anti-intellectualism at several points. His bias discredits and discounts those who simply have religious insight but do not systematize it, labeling such mystics as secondary in status. It is my opinion that Stace has given undue preference to those who happen to think like himself.It also is evident that in not further breaking down this typology, he makes a broad generalization between "introverted thinkers" and "extroverted feelers" in a very "either/or" sort of fashion excluding anything in the middle (i.e. an extroverted thinker or introverted feeler). In making this generalization, Stace presumes introversion to be categorically superior to extroversion as it often ends with rational analysis. I think Stace has undermined his own position by not thinking through the implications of this generalization.As an ultimate systematization, or even an initial step in systematizing religious experience, Stace fails, but that is not to say that he is not without merit (as per my 4 stars). If one reads him with such concern in mind, his optimism and drive to seek the universal is nothing short of inspiring, especially when compared to Katz (who denies anything meaningful can be said about religious experience). I compare both Stace and Katz to watching some politically spun "news" program like Bill O'Rielly or John Stewart. Sure, they may be fun, but one must keep in mind that both are catering to a specific bias. If you can remain mindful of such a bias, then you have a chance at seeing through to what lies beneath in order to conduct your own study.