Move it. György Buzsáki discusses how higher cognitive functions and consciousness do not arise in an isolated vacuum inside an isolated brain, but in interaction with neurophysiological movement. He discusses alternatives to both inherited systems and tabula rasa - the blank slate models. These are aspects of movement and change in which all living things have a body with a physiological and electrobiological evolutionary development. Buzsáki is very cautious theoretically about the complicated electrophysiology of the brain, which he discusses in detail. I think this is brilliant and opens up many new possibilities for how the biochemical action potential might eventually interact with parallel electromagnetic systems between individual neurons - a neural 69.According to Buzsáki, the brain is a self-organising system whose main task is to predict meaningful activities for survival. Although he does not completely reject the old reactive learning paradigm (US-CS; etc.), he notes that the brain is not primarily a reactive device, but a predictive one. In self-adapting algorithmic mechanisms (with predictive errors) it is a kind of search engine, which in a psychologising context might be called "curiosity" - which is a fundamental survival mechanism. As a psychotherapist, one looks at when, where and how a patient's positive curiosity is triggered ("motivation").Buzsáki describes the brain as a predictive device that interacts with the environment to control our future decisions. The hypothesis is that our brains are born with a myriad of nonsense patterns, and by synchronising these nonsense patterns into cognitive or motor activities, they are shaped for meaningful learning.Is time perception just an illusion, relative to our perceived internal and external motion? Perhaps it is enough to think about a boring memory to realise this? Or that time perception varies between different ages and different experiences.... Buzsáki presents preliminary findings suggesting that hippocampal place and grid cells may have multiple sets of modalities that can also be understood simultaneously as "time cells" and thus encode memories as "memory cells" based on three aspects: distance, duration and "what system". He discusses how the distinction between place cells and time cells is actually irrelevant to the thinking brain, instead it is "how downstream reader mechanisms classify hippocampal messages". He sees the hippocampus as a general-purpose generator, encoding, sequencing and thus structuring the limited amount of ordinal-scale information available, heuristically covering the spaces between the various events that need to be ordered to provide a comprehensible context - albeit sometimes entirely contrived: compare how we try to make sense of various optical illusions. The hippocampus, in this context, is a repetitive apparatus, blindly doing the same thing over and over again in order to be encoded by frontal mechanisms.